University of New Mexico

UNM Digital Repository
Law of the Rio Chama

The Utton Transboundary Resources Center

2-2015

Trading Dams
Dave Owen
Colin Apse

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/uc_rio_chama

Recommended Citation
Owen, Dave and Colin Apse. "Trading Dams." (2015). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/uc_rio_chama/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the The Utton Transboundary Resources Center at UNM
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law of the Rio Chama by an authorized administrator of
UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu,
sarahrk@unm.edu.

McKenzie, Colin 10/23/2017
For Educational Use Only

TRADING DAMS, 48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1043

48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1043
U.C. Davis Law Review
February, 2015
Article

Dave Owen d1 a1 Colin Apse aa1
Copyright (c) 2015 Dave Owen & Colin Apse

TRADING DAMS
Over the past forty years, environmental trading systems have emerged as one of the primary innovations of
American environmental law. In fields ranging from climate change mitigation to wetlands protection, regulated
entities may now proceed with otherwise proscribed activities in return for providing extra protection at some
other place or time. At their best, these trades achieve environmental goals while increasing flexibility and
lowering the economic costs of regulation. In practice, that promise has not always been achieved, and the
emergence of environmental trading systems has at times been quite controversial. But they have become
increasingly pervasive.
This Article considers environmental trading in a new context. The United States contains tens of thousands
of dams, and these dams have drastically altered river systems. While many of these dams also provide
important societal benefits, a major reconfiguration of America's dams would greatly improve those dams'
collective balance between benefits and harms. To date, that kind of major reconfiguration has not taken place.
But a restoration project on Maine's Penobscot River illustrates how trading might create such change. By
exchanging reduced environmental regulatory constraints and increased energy generation in some locations
for dam removals and other environmental improvements elsewhere, the project will create major environmental
improvements without any loss of hydropower.
*1044 Using that project as a model, this Article analyzes how trading systems might facilitate better
reconciliation of the positive benefits and negative impacts of dams. Our conclusions are qualified; while we
argue that trading systems hold promise, applying them to dams will not be easy. Nevertheless, the concept is
worth pursuing, and we offer a series of legal reforms to that end. More broadly, the analysis illustrates both the
promise and the challenges that face environmental trading systems as they continue their expansion through
the field of environmental law.
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*1045 INTRODUCTION
On the morning of July 22, 2013, an excavator smashed through the Veazie Dam, allowing the Penobscot
River to spill through. 1 It was a historic moment. Opposition--often unsuccessful--to dam construction
helped forge the American environmental movement, and the removal of any dam therefore carries potent
symbolism. 2 This was no exception. Political figures flocked to the breaching, the Penobscot Indian Tribe
commemorated the event with ceremonies, and the New York Times described the removal as emblematic
“of a nationwide movement.” 3 Dam removals can also bring enormous ecological benefits, and on this
front the Veazie Dam removal seems particularly promising. Because of its somewhat remote location, the
Penobscot River's profile remains lower than that of Chesapeake Bay, the Everglades, or California's BayDelta--the three tragically flawed icons of American environmental restoration. 4 But the Penobscot River
Restoration Project, of which the Veazie Dam removal is a key part, is one of the most ambitious river
restoration projects in the world.
Even with these removals, however, the Penobscot remains a dammed river, and hydropower at some of
its remaining dams actually is slated to increase. 5 This, too, reflects a larger story. The United States is
the *1046 world's leader in dam removals, 6 but the overwhelming majority of its dams remain in place,
with no plans for removal. 7 Hydropower continues to generate more electricity than all other sources of
renewable energy 8 combined. 9 Many energy policy advocates, as well as many members of Congress, want
more hydropower, particularly at the many dams that currently generate no hydropower or that could be
upgraded to generate more. 10 In the United States, enthusiasm for building new dams has waned, 11 but in
many other nations it remains strong. 12 The environmental accounting of dams has also evolved, and dam
supporters increasingly can draw upon arguments that ought to resonate with their traditional adversaries.
Often--though, importantly, not always--hydropower is a relatively clean energy *1047 source, with low
emissions of conventional air pollutants and greenhouse gases. 13
Notwithstanding hydropower's emissions benefits, the tension between these stories might seem profound,
for environmental advocates have long regarded dams simply as “evil--placed and solid.” 14 On the
Penobscot River, however, the two stories are closely, and legally, linked in a very different way: the dam
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removals and hydropower upgrades all are part of a negotiated deal. 15 The terms of the agreement are
complex, but at its core is a trade. In return for withholding opposition to continued dam operations
at several sites and for paying the dams' owner a substantial sum of money, environmentalists and the
Penobscot Indian Tribe secured the removal of two dams, the decommissioning of a third, and upgrades to
fish passage capacity at several others. 16 In other words, the tribe traded environmental restoration in some
places for increased hydropower generation in others (and, again, for money). The net result will be major
improvements in environmental quality, including approximately a thousand miles of additional habitat
access for migratory fish, with no net loss of hydropower capacity. 17 For good reason, the project has been
hailed worldwide as a model. 18
The core question considered by this Article is how to replicate that model and, more specifically, how law
can facilitate that replication. That is an important question, for the need for imitation is much greater than
most people realize. The United States' dams' ecological impacts are enormous. But energy remains a basic
societal need, and other *1048 energy sources do immense environmental damage. 19 Projects that reduce
the ecological impacts of dams while maximizing hydropower-generating capacity therefore would be quite
valuable. The potential for such projects also could be substantial. The United States contains over 87,000
“large” dams, only three percent of which actually generate hydropower. 20 On many rivers, combining
hydropower installations or upgrades at some locations with environmental restoration projects at others
seems possible, at least as a matter of science and engineering. 21 Similarly, in other countries where dam
construction remains a national priority, 22 more rational siting processes could reduce dams' devastating
impacts on river systems. At the same time, dams could lessen demand for energy sources, like coal, whose
environmental and health impacts can be even worse. 23
Economic and environmental need alone will not be sufficient to ensure replication, however. Law matters
as well, and here, too, the Penobscot River Restoration Project shows promise as a model. Though
it applies that concept in a novel setting, the project reflects environmental law's growing emphasis
on trading systems. 24 Such systems now pervade conventional air quality regulation, and they have
assumed increasingly important roles in greenhouse gas regulation, *1049 wetlands protection, fisheries
management, habitat protection, and a variety of other contexts. 25 Within those many realms, trading
systems come in a wide variety of forms. The archetypal trading system is a cap-and-trade program, 26
in which trades are numerous, trading currencies are well-developed, and transaction costs are low. But
there are other programs in which governmental intervention is nearly continuous and trades resemble
bartered deals more than the outputs of a functioning market. 27 In all of these contexts, trading systems
share key common features. Most importantly, they involve trading increased protection in some times or
places for increased environmental degradation at others, and they use those trades as means to provide
greater flexibility and economic efficiency. 28 They also have spawned an extraordinary volume of legal and
economic research, and, in some circles, have become almost synonymous with regulatory innovation. 29
Indeed, some prominent commentators argue that trading systems are the economically and democratically
optimal mode of regulation, and therefore should be the central regulatory instrument of environmental
law. 30 Dams, then, might seem like the logical next frontier, and the Penobscot project, with its impressive
balance of environmental *1050 improvement and sustained energy production, would seem to exemplify
the possibilities. 31
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Environmental law's forty-year experiment with trading systems, however, demonstrates that applying
trading concepts in this context would not be simple. While trading systems have succeeded in some contexts,
in others their track record is quite mixed. 32 Many theoretical and empirical critiques of trading systems
have helped explain their uneven record. 33 The history of environmental trading systems therefore provides
grounds for caution, and the cautionary tale clearly applies to dams. The complexities of dams, and the
rivers they occupy, will probably never allow for anything akin to the high-volume, low-transaction-cost
markets that exist for things like carbon or sulfur dioxide emissions. Even more barter-like systems will be
challenging to create. 34
But that cautionary note should not end the inquiry. A third lesson of environmental trading systems is that
they can be functional, and useful, even where they never will approach an economist's ideal market.Trading
systems also can become more effective as both regulators and the regulated learn and adapt. 35 Even
in contexts that never will be optimal for trading systems, they can succeed as components of broader
regulatory regimes. 36 These possibilities inform our core conclusions, which are that more dam trading
should occur; *1051 reforms to facilitate trading should be implemented; and the process of regulatory
experimentation and learning should begin. 37
This Article's analysis proceeds as follows: Part Isurveys the status of dams in the United States, discussing
their current and potential value, their environmental harms, and the complex legal regimes to which they
are subject. That analysis underscores the need for more projects like the Penobscot, as well as the extent to
which dams, which lately have lacked the legal-academic cachet of wind, solar, or fracking, remain crucially
important for energy and environmental law. Part IIdescribes the Penobscot River Restoration Project in
more detail. Part III then draws on the history and literature of environmental trading systems to evaluate
their potential application to dams, and to identify factors that could facilitate or discourage other projects
like the Penobscot. Part IV builds on that evaluation to recommend reforms that would make dam trading
a more widespread option.
In describing those reforms, and in providing a broader analysis of the possibilities for dam trading, we offer
three primary contributions to the existing literature. Most importantly, we identify steps that would help
reconcile society's interest in reducing the massive environmental impacts of dams with its need for nonfossil fuel energy. While many articles have focused on the former problem, 38 and some, more recently,
have considered hydropower's potential contributions to the latter goal, 39 none has provided an in-depth
analysis of the extent to which these seemingly opposing goals may be legally reconciled. 40 Relatedly,
*1052 this Article provides the broadest analysis of which we are aware of thelegal incentive structures
that drive or, more often, inhibit thoughtful management of our system of dams. Our final contribution is
to provide a window into a cutting edge of environmental trading systems, which have evolved considerably
since they first emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. 41 An analysis of dams illustrates both emerging possibilities
and continuing challenges.
I. THE PREVALENCE, LAW, AND ECOLOGY OF DAMS
In any legal system, the desirability of new regulatory instruments depends in large part on the nature of the
things being regulated and the structure of the existing legal regime. Dams are no exception, and this Part
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therefore provides a background account of the United States' dams and their governing laws. Although
the law, economics, and ecology of dams are complicated, the basic point is straightforward: our physical
system of dams is enormous and in many ways outdated, and reconfiguring that system could produce major
social and environmental benefits. But existing legal systems do little to encourage such reconfiguration and
in some ways are impediments to change. Consequently, any regulatory reform that better reconciles the
benefits and costs of dams, which is exactly what trading systems are supposed to do, would be a significant
improvement.
A. The Continued Importance of Dams
Perhaps the best indicator of the continued importance of dams, and the law governing them, lies in sheer
numbers. According to the National Inventory of Dams, there are over 87,359 dams in the United States. 42
The actual number is significantly higher, for the inventory includes only dams that meet certain size or
safety thresholds, and one recent study estimated that an additional two million smaller dams *1053
populate the American landscape. 43 Even based on the inventory number alone, the United States contains
approximately one dam for every day the nation has been in existence. 44 Because of those dams, the United
States' river systems are heavily and pervasively engineered, so much so that a free-flowing river, for most
Americans, is an exotic concept. 45 For example, the Hudson River basin alone contains over 1,726 dams, 46
which translates to approximately one dam for every eight miles of stream or river. 47
Collectively, dams serve a wide variety of purposes, including providing water supply, recreation, and flood
control. Among those many purposes, one of the most important--and a central focus of this Article-is generating hydropower. According to the Energy Information Administration, hydropower generated
approximately seven percent of the United States' electricity in 2013. 48 While that number may seem
small, and is less than the global average of 16%, a few comparisons place it in perspective. 49 Based
on the EIA's 2013 figures, hydropower generated twice as much electricity as wind and approximately
twenty-six times as much energy as solar power. 50 The EIA's projections show those gaps closing, with
hydropower in moderate decline and other renewable energy sources growing. 51 But *1054 even if those
trends continue, hydropower will remain the United States' predominant source of renewable energy for
several more years. 52 In many other countries, that dominance is even more pronounced. 53
The energy generated by hydropower also is particularly important. Its cost per kilowatt hour can be
relatively low, and it also provides energy managers with important flexibility. 54 Water discharges through
turbines can be shifted to periods of higher energy demand, 55 and hydropower also can dispatch to a
grid with minimal startup time, making it an important source following blackouts. 56 As intermittent
sources like wind and solar grow more prevalent, that flexibility is likely to become increasingly valuable. 57
Perhaps most importantly, most of the United States' hydropower is nearly emissions-free, 58 while fossil
fuel combustion generates most of the United States conventional air pollutants and greenhouse gases. 59
Consequently, if hydropower substitutes for fossil fuel energy generation or provides the flexibility that
allows increased reliance on other renewable sources, it offers an enormous environmental benefit. 60
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While hydropower is one of the most important societal benefits provided by dams, most dams do not
actually generate hydropower. According to a recent study from the Idaho National Laboratory, “[T]he
United States hydroelectric plant population is comprised of 2,388 licensed plants.” 61 That number may
sound large, but it means that approximately 97% of the dams in the national inventory do not *1055
produce hydropower. That percentage is somewhat misleading, for hydropower tends to be generated at
larger dams, and most of the non-producing dams are relatively small. 62 Nevertheless, the huge number
of dams that produce no hydropower has sparked widespread interest in increasing our hydropower
capacity. 63 In addition to those dams, locks and other waterworks could be fitted with hydropower
equipment, and dams with older turbines could be upgraded. 64 The extent to which those upgrades would
be environmentally and economically feasible is a more difficult question--and also a question whose answer
depends on the regulatory regime for, and economics of, other energy sources. 65 Nevertheless, a series of
studies shows that even under existing regulatory and economic conditions, the power upgrades on some
of the Penobscot River dams could be replicated elsewhere. 66
The absence of hydropower at many existing dams underscores a larger point: some dams are less valuable
than others, and some are not valuable at all. In addition to hydropower, many dams play valuable roles
in storing water supplies, supporting recreation, and reducing floods. 67 But other dams have long outlived
their original purposes; the northeastern United States, for example, is filled with milldams that have long
outlasted their mills. 68 Dams also become structurally *1056 obsolete as trapped sediment fills in their
reservoirs and their structures decay. 69 Over time, these dams can turn into public hazards. 70 Others never
made much sense, for the history of dam planning is filled with stories of pork-barrel boondoggles justified
by fictitious cost-benefit analyses. 71 Despite that history, many dams continue to provide significant
societal benefits, and others could be upgraded to serve more modern purposes. 72 But our present system
of dams remains quite different from one optimally designed to serve contemporary needs.
For the legal field, the continued importance of dams has significant implications. In practice, at least, the
law of dams has never really faded away. For decades, dams have been generating cases by the dozens,
and hydropower licensing remains an important and active sub-field of energy and environmental law. 73
Nevertheless, while recent years have brought an energy law boom, academics and activists have focused
primarily on wind, solar, and the enormous expansion in domestic oil and gas generation. One could easily
form the impression that dams are nowhere near the cutting edge of energy law. But the continued prevalence
of dams and the potential for upgrades, as well as pervasive problems with our existing dam systems, raise
the possibility of a very different future, with major changes in our existing dam system helping hydropower
reemerge as a dynamic and growing area of law.
*1057 B. The Adverse Impacts of Dams
While the conventional story of dams may miss their potential to be a dynamic and growing source of
relatively carbon-free energy, there is another important respect in which that story is spot-on. Dams cause
enormous environmental harms. 74
Dams impact aquatic systems in many ways. Most obviously, most dams flood land behind the dam. 75
Dams also affect downstream flow, particularly if the flow schedule is governed by hydropower or other
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human needs. 76 The annual hydrograph of a dam-managed river is often quite different from an undammed
stream, and those fluctuations can wreak havoc on downstream species that have adapted to a natural
flow regime. 77 Dams also can decrease the aggregate amount of water flowing downstream, both because
of evaporation and because many dams operate in conjunction with off-stream water supply projects. 78
And dams can starve downstream reaches of sediment, which again can dramatically alter downstream
habitats. 79
All of those impacts are pervasive, but perhaps the most significant ecological impact of dams is to limit
the movement of aquatic species. Many rivers play important roles in the lifecycle of diadromous species,
like salmon or shad, which migrate between fresh and salt water. 80 Those species in turn can play central
roles in the ecology of river systems, both by providing prey for other species and by moving huge *1058
quantities of nutrients between oceans and rivers. 81 By blocking access to habitat, dams can devastate those
species' populations, with ripple effects on all the other species, including humans, that depend on their
migrations. 82 Dams also can adversely affect resident species that do not migrate out of the river system.
Barriers can prevent these species from relocating in response to habitat stress or seasonal changes, and they
can promote inbreeding within isolated populations. 83 When a portion of a watershed loses its population
of a species to disease or some other disturbance, barriers can prevent repopulation from areas where the
species has survived. 84
The scale of these impacts has been profound. To provide one example, a single board blocking a fish
ladder on Maine's St. Croix River caused a migratory population of alewives to drop from 2.6 million to
900 fish in the span of just seven years. 85 That story is not unique, and the aggregate impact of tens of
thousands of migration barriers is sufficiently pervasive that few people even realize how productive many
river systems once were. 86 Before the industrial revolution, East Coast fish runs were so abundant that, in
one explorer's creative phrasing, “it seemed to mee, that one might goe over their backs drishod.” 87 Even
as late as 1832, the Potomac River shad catch was over fifty-one million *1059 kilograms. 88 The demise of
the East Coast runs initially generated conflicts, fought with guns as well as petitions and legal briefs, and in
the time of the United States' Founding Fathers, legal battles over fish passage were recurring phenomena
(and phenomena in which the Founding Fathers themselves participated). 89 But outside of a few relic runs,
that abundance has long since been lost, not just to river systems but also to cultural memory. 90 On the
West Coast, where dams came later, some cultural memories remain, but migratory fish still have gone from
storied abundance to chronic endangerment. 91 The changes aren't limited to iconic migrants, or even to
fish. Aquatic freshwater species now are more likely to be listed as threatened or endangered than any other
class of species, and dams and diversions are among the largest threats to their survival. 92
Of course, not all of the environmental impacts are negative. Some popular sport species thrive in damaltered environments. 93 Dams can prevent the migration of invasive as well as native species. 94 Reservoirs
allow flatwater boating, and altered flows also can support recreation in downstream areas where summer
flows otherwise would be too low. 95 *1060 Finally, to the extent that hydropower obviates the need
to burn oil, natural gas, or coal, dams provide an important environmental benefit to river systems, for
climate change also ranks high as a threat to freshwater ecosystems. 96 In short, dams present environmental
tradeoffs, and sometimes environmental damage is in the eye of the beholder. Nevertheless, there is little
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debate that the environmental impact of many dams, both individually and cumulatively, is profoundly
negative. 97
One consequence of these impacts has been to generate interest in dam removal. Twenty-five years ago, the
idea was largely a novelty, though occasional dam removals have occurred throughout American history. 98
But beginning in the 1990s, the idea went mainstream. 99 Hundreds of dams have come out, and while most
of the removals have involved small structures, a few medium-sized dams have recently been removed. 100
The trend is still a minor one; while dam removals tend to grab attention, only a small percentage of
the United States dams have actually come out. 101 Dam removal also is not a panacea, for removals
are unlikely to completely restore rivers to their prior condition. 102 But the improvements are often fast
and dramatic. 103 Consequently, even if dam removal remains an incomplete and, to date, relatively rare
approach to environmental restoration, it still holds transformative potential for many river systems.
To date, those removals have been largely opportunistic; rarely have dams come out pursuant to some larger
plan. 104 But impacts vary *1061 significantly from dam to dam, and that variance creates opportunities
for prioritization. 105 Obviously size matters, and a large dam generally will have greater impacts than a
smaller one. 106 Location also is important. A dam near a natural fish barrier, or upstream of another
dam, will do less ecological damage than one that blocks access to many miles of habitat. 107 The design
of dams also is important. For example, some have better fish passage systems than others, and some have
no fish passage at all. 108 Similarly, a dam operated in run-of-the-river mode 109 will generally have lower
impacts than one that creates a large reservoir as it retains inflows. 110 Finally, the extent to which the
dam alters the downstream flow regime can make a substantial difference, and mimicking the natural flow
regime can reduce, though not eliminate, some of a dam's adverse effects. 111 Consequently, when engineers
consider where and how to build dams, or when regulators consider where to require fish passage, flow
changes or dam removals, there are significant differences between the environmental impacts of alternative
proposals. 112
*1062 C. The Legal Regime
The central point of the preceding discussion is that our system of dams is enormous, influential, and
haphazardly matched to modern societal needs. Ideally, our response would be a broad program of dam
reform, in which many dams come out and others are re-operated to produce different benefits-- including,
sometimes, more hydropower--and in which those adjustments follow careful planning efforts designed to
identify the best places for changes. The extent to which that response can occur, however, depends partly
upon law, and this section therefore reviews the laws of dams. It is necessarily a brief overview, for these
laws are much too complex to describe in detail in a few pages. Nevertheless, even this brief summary should
illustrate two overarching points. First, key parts of existing law create a strong bias toward the status quo,
and against any actions that would either generate new hydropower or lead to dam removals. Second, while
the system allows systemic reassessment of dams, it does almost nothing to compel such analysis. It is, in
short, a system suited primarily for sporadic, ad hoc adjustments.
1. Federally-Regulated Hydropower Dams
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The most extensive legal regime applies to hydropower dams that are licensed by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”). 113 FERC has jurisdiction over all hydroelectric dams located on
waterways to which federal commerce clause or public lands authority extends. 114 Only a small percentage
of dams meet those criteria; because most dams do not generate hydropower, they fall outside FERC's
jurisdiction, as do the dams that the federal government itself owns. 115 Nevertheless, hydropower dams
are often relatively big, and FERC-regulated dams *1063 therefore produce a disproportionate share of
social benefits and environmental costs. 116
The core statute governing FERC's hydropower licensing authority is the Federal Power Act (“FPA”). 117
The FPA contains detailed procedural provisions setting forth the requirements for licensing processes, 118
defines the substantive standards FERC must use to evaluate license applications, 119 and also defines
the boundaries between state and federal authority over hydropower systems. 120 For decades, FERC
interpreted and applied those provisions in ways that favored strong federal authority and expanding
hydropower, and the agency was widely perceived as closely aligned with, and perhaps captured by, the
industry it was charged with regulating. 121 Congress often encouraged that alignment. Even in the 1970s,
after the dawn of the environmental law era, an energy-hungry Congress continued to create incentives for
aggressive hydropower development. 122
In the 1970s and 1980s, however, the tide began to turn, and a series of legal changes turned the FPA into
a more environmentally protective statute. 123 Some of those changes were internal to the FPA. Congress
made environmental protection one of the core goals of the licensing process, and it also empowered
other government agencies to demand that FERC condition licenses upon environmental protection
measures, including the installation of facilities to allow fish passage. 124 Some *1064 derived from other
environmental statutes. Most importantly, FERC must comply with the National Environmental Policy Act
(“NEPA”), which requires detailed assessments of the environmental impacts of licensing decisions; 125 the
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), which prohibits FERC from approving actions that would “jeopardize”
the continued existence of protected species or adversely modify their “critical habitat,” and also limits
“take” of protected species; 126 and section 401 of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), which obligates license
applicants to obtain certifications that their proposed operations will be consistent with state water quality
standards. 127 FERC initially resisted these requirements, but federal court decisions in the 1980s and 1990s
made clear that each was mandatory. 128 These requirements give environmental regulators and advocates
ample influence on licensing, and sometimes that influence produces dramatic changes. 129 Nearly every
FERC license includes conditions designed to provide environmental protection, and occasionally the
proposed conditions are sufficiently costly that dam owners elect to cease operation or, at least, to enter
negotiations over possible dam removals. 130
Nevertheless, there are other ways in which the FERC process limits environmental regulators' and activists'
leverage. Perhaps the most important is the duration of the licenses. FERC typically issues licenses for
forty-year terms, and sometimes for longer. 131 While some legal *1065 obligations apply throughout the
term of the license, and while FERC often includes “reopener” clauses allowing it to initiate proceedings
to adjust the license terms, 132 the federal agency action necessary to trigger CWA section 401, NEPA,
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or section 7 of the ESA is absent in the period between licensing proceedings. 133 The FPA's relicensing
requirements also favor the status quo in other ways. If a license expires without being replaced, which can
happen if the relicensing proceeding becomes protracted, the default outcome is to replace the old license
with a one-year license on the same terms. 134 That provides licensees with a favorable fallback option,
particularly if, as is often the case, the proposed new license is likely to have more environmentally restrictive
terms. Similarly, in 2005, Congress amended the FPA's procedural requirements to allow licensees to request
evidentiary hearings on proposed fish-protection conditions. 135 The apparent intent of these amendments
was to make the imposition of environmental constraints more procedurally difficult for the regulating
agencies. 136 Preliminary anecdotal evidence suggests that Congress succeeded in achieving that goal. 137
The net result of all of these legal provisions (and others not summarized here) has been to turn FERC
licensing into one of the most complex processes in all of environmental law. To try to rationalize
and accelerate the process, and to provide a better format for integrating input from the many other
agencies, advocacy groups, and members of the public that typically participate, FERC has developed
an “alternative licensing process” and, more recently, an “integrated licensing process.” 138 FERC also
encourages stakeholders to reach settlements *1066 before the formal FERC proceeding begins. 139 But
even with those innovations, the process can be contentious and long. FERC demands that licensees begin
preparing for relicensing at least five years before the old license's expiration date, and many licensing
processes take at least that long. 140
These legal changes also have changed FERC's role. Once widely perceived as an active promoter of the
hydropower industry, FERC now often occupies a role more akin to a judge facilitating a settlement in
a complex civil case. 141 It rarely imposes its own vision on the proceedings, and instead now occupies a
largely reactive and facilitative role. 142
That complexity has contributed to another distinctive feature of the FERC licensing process. FERC tends
to make decisions one project at a time. 143 The FPA doesn't mandate that approach; in fact, it specifically
states that FERC's should approve only projects that “will be best adapted to a comprehensive plan for
improving or developing a waterway or waterways . . . .” 144 With the consent of a license applicant, FERC
also will occasionally consolidate multiple licensing proceedings. 145 But FERC has essentially rejected its
planning mandate, with the acquiescence of the courts, 146 and multi-project proceedings, *1067 while not
unheard of, are rare. 147 The usual consequence is project-by-project decision-making. 148
2. Federally Owned Dams
While the FERC regulatory process dominates the legal-academic literature on dams, the federal
government also owns dams, and those dams are beyond FERC's jurisdiction. 149 Between them, seven
federal agencies own 171 hydroelectric dams. 150 Many of these dams are among the nation's largest-collectively, they contain just over 50% of the nation's hydroelectric capacity--and they have some of the
farthest-reaching environmental and non-environmental effects. 151 They also are subject to a very different
legal regime.
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The authorizing statute for each dam provides the primary legal blueprint for its management, with
subsequent water resource development acts providing additional overlays. 152 Those blueprints can be
complex, often specifying multiple purposes for management of the dam. 153 What they generally do not
do, however, is create administrative processes for reconsidering dam operations. Federally owned dams
therefore are not subject to a process like FERC relicensing, and the leverage that the FPA supplies to other
agencies and to environmental advocates is missing. Similarly, CWA section 401, *1068 which supplies
states with significant leverage over FERC-regulated projects, does not apply. 154
That does not mean federally owned dams are free of regulatory constraint. In addition to authorizing
legislation, other federal statutes, like the ESA and NEPA, do still apply. 155 Indeed, ESA obligations
provide one of the primary legal levers that advocates can use to compel changes in federal dam
management, and on ongoing dispute on California's Yuba River, where the National Marine
Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) recently attempted to compel a massive fish passage project, illustrates the
possibilities. 156 Congress also has often authorized, if not clearly obligated, changes designed to mitigate
the adverse environmental effects of federal water projects. 157 But the absence of a relicensing process with
a regulatory overseer creates a very different, and often weaker, leverage structure than exists for FERCregulated dams.
Because of these differences, environmental advocates and regulators generally have less influence over
federally owned dams than they do over federally regulated dams. That disparity in influence also can
produce some interesting side effects. On some river systems, the first dam anadromous fish encounter
as they migrate upstream is a federally owned dam, and upstream from that dam is a series of FERCregulated dams. 158 In that circumstance, the federally owned dam can serve as a *1069 partial regulatory
shield, keeping protected fish populations, and the legal obligations that come with them, from reaching
the upstream dams.
3. State-Regulated Dams
The legal literature on dams focuses overwhelmingly on those regulated or, to a much lesser extent, owned
by the federal government, and in practice, those dams generate much of the controversy and litigation. 159
There are obvious reasons for that focus; the largest and most heavily regulated dams generally fall within
these groups, and advocates are sensible to focus their efforts where they can exert the most leverage. 160
But over 97% of dams are neither owned by the federal government nor regulated by FERC, and while their
collective impacts may not rise to the level of the federal behemoths, those impacts still are significant. 161
No synopsis of dam regulation would be complete, therefore, without some discussion of state law.
Providing that discussion is difficult, however, because of two factors. First, dam laws vary from state to
state, as do the financial and administrative resources that states devote to implementing their dam laws. 162
Second, while a few studies summarize the dam laws of individual states, no comprehensive state-by-state
guide to the environmental law of dams exists. 163 There are good and recent studies of state dam safety
laws and of the treatment of hydropower in state renewable portfolio standards, but our discussion of the
environmental *1070 regulation of dams is based largely on a review of the dam laws of a select set of
states. 164
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Despite these caveats, even a partial review of state dam laws supports a few generalizations. The first
is that state environmental regulation of existing dams is generally quite lax. 165 None of the states we
reviewed had a re-licensing requirement analogous to that created by the FPA. 166 Moreover, we identified
few other procedural or substantive levers to compel reconsideration of the impacts of existing dams. 167
Instead, in most states, a dam, once built, is grandfathered from the requirements of environmental laws. 168
Many of those dams were constructed before significant environmental laws existed or, at least, before those
laws were acknowledged and enforced. 169 The environmental laws of many states therefore have never
really applied to most of those states' dams. 170 Indeed, in many states, the only way environmental laws
would be triggered is if a dam owner proposes to do something different with a dam--like, for example, add
hydropower capacity or take the dam out. 171
*1071 On paper, state regulation of dam safety is more robust. Most states have safety standards and
laws requiring periodic inspection of dams, and safety reviews ought to present opportunities to reexamine
the operations or even existence of dams. 172 But on closer examination, those schemes also often appear-in the words of one leading expert--“pitiful.” 173 Maine, for example, has robust requirements for dam
inspections but has never adequately funded the inspection program. 174 Texas recently passed legislation
exempting many dams from its inspection program, and Texas law, at least as currently interpreted, also
limits the public's ability to even access information about dam hazards. 175 Many other states face similar
circumstances. 176 Dams do age and fail, but because of these oversight gaps, smaller dam owners in many
states are all but legally invisible so long as nothing goes drastically wrong. Indeed, there are thousands of
state-regulated dams whose owners aren't even known. 177
Despite the prevalence of laissez-faire regimes, there are some incentives for reducing the environmental
and safety impacts of dams. In most states, a dam owner faces tort liability if his dam fails, or if a boater
is injured by a deteriorating dam structure. 178 The United States *1072 has a long tradition of passing
laws designed to promote fish passage, and while those laws were often observed largely in the breach, a few
court decisions have given them significant effect. 179 And some states have created legal mechanisms and
offices devoted to helping dam owners move through the removal process, or to allowing the state to assume
responsibility for abandoned dams. 180 But those programs are rare unless one counts laws empowering
government agencies to dynamite beaver dams, 181 and state dam regulation on the whole remains rather
limited. Consequently, quite often the most procedurally straightforward thing for a state-regulated dam
owner to do with his dam turns out to be nothing at all. 182
While state dam law does little to spur better environmental management, it sometimes does encourage
hydropower development. States use an extraordinary variety of pricing mechanisms to incentivize
renewable energy, including renewable portfolio standards, 183 net metering programs, green power
purchasing options, and property tax *1073 rebates. 184 Some of these programs include hydropower. 185
Typically, state programs are limited to small hydropower sources, and environmental criteria sometimes
apply. 186 Many dams, including larger hydropower systems, therefore are likely to be excluded from
these programs, no matter how much the dam owners do to mitigate their facilities' adverse environmental
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effects. 187 Conversely, and perversely, in some states a small hydropower facility is eligible for favorable
pricing even if its environmental impacts are drastic. 188 But a variety of programs does create incentives
for constructing new hydropower systems. 189
Nevertheless, state dam law on the whole generally provides only weak incentives to take proactive steps
with dams. Aside from pricing incentives in a subset of states (and applicable to a subset of dams), states do
little to encourage dam owners to upgrade their systems. Similarly, they do little to penalize owners whose
dams produce adverse environmental consequences or even safety threats. And state programs to encourage
comprehensive reassessment of dam systems are nearly unheard of. 190
II. THE PENOBSCOT PROJECT
While the United States' dam laws may entrench the status quo, dam policy does retain moments of
dynamism. In the past century, over one *1074 thousand of the United States' dams have come out, 191
and the possibility of adding additional hydropower capacity has generated a flurry of studies. 192 But
both trends are limited and largely piecemeal, and the trends also are almost entirely disconnected from
each other. Efforts to prioritize environmental and energy improvement projects throughout entire river
basins are generally absent from American dam policy. 193 That is problematic, and the Penobscot River
Restoration Project, which this section describes in depth, illustrates the potential benefits of an alternative
approach.
The Penobscot River arises in a lightly developed region of northeastern Maine. 194 Forests, lakes, wetlands,
and tributary streams fill the watershed, and the river discharges into what once were some of the richest
fishing grounds in the world. 195 In its natural state, the river supported remarkable populations of
fish, many of which migrated between fresh and saltwater to reproduce. 196 But as the United States
industrialized, the timber industry began using the waterway for log drives, 197 and factories, mills, and
municipal wastewater systems used the river as a conduit for their wastes. 198 With industrialization came
dams, and as of 2011, 107 dams were distributed throughout the watershed. 199
The effect on the river's fisheries was predictable and dramatic. 200 The log drives are long gone, and
the CWA improved water quality, but fish *1075 populations remain a small fraction of their historic
levels. 201 The Atlantic salmon run, which once topped 100,000 fish, now averages approximately 2,000
fish per year. 202 A 2004 National Research Council study explained why: “the greatest impediment to
the increase of salmon populations in Maine is the obstruction of their passage up and down streams and
degradation of their habitat caused by dams.” 203 American shad, which once were the most commercially
valuable species in the river, and were much more abundant than salmon, are nearly gone. 204 Along with
Atlantic salmon, shortnose sturgeon are now endangered, and the NMFS lists alewife and blueback herring
as “species of concern.” 205 Those ecological changes brought unfortunate human consequences. For the
Penobscot Indian Tribe, which viewed the river as “a sacred, living entity that is central to the Tribe's
cultural identity,” the degradation was devastating. 206 Fishing was integral to the tribe's connection to the
river, but the tribe hasn't been able to exercise its fishing rights for more than a century. 207 Non-native
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fishermen also have suffered. Recent fisheries research strongly suggests that diadromous fish population
declines contributed to the poor condition of the Gulf of Maine's ocean fisheries, and that poor condition,
and the *1076 turmoil it created, have led NMFS to classify the New England fishery as an “economic
disaster.” 208
That combination of cultural and environmental loss, on the one hand, and recovery potential on the other
made the Penobscot a target for restoration efforts. 209 A somewhat unique ownership situation heightened
the potential. In many river basins, dam ownership is fragmented, and that fragmentation creates challenges
for anyone interested in developing a coordinated management scheme. 210 In the lower reaches of the
Penobscot watershed, however, a more consolidated ownership pattern existed.
In 1999, PPL Corporation purchased all of the dams in the lower Penobscot basin, consolidating ownership
within a single corporate entity. 211 Several of those dams' license renewals already were in dispute, with
strong opposition from environmental groups and the Penobscot Indian Tribe, and PPL was willing to
expand settlement discussions to encompass other dams that were not presently under review. 212 For
environmental groups and the Penobscot Indian Tribe, these dam relicensing processes presented an
important opportunity.
Recent changes on other rivers provided some basis for optimism. A few years earlier, environmental
regulators and advocacy organizations had used the relicensing process for the Edwards Dam, on the
nearby Kennebec River, as an opportunity to advocate for improved fishways. 213 The end result was a
nationally celebrated dam removal *1077 project. 214 Similar initiatives were underway at some major west
coast dams, including the Elwha and Glines Canyon Dams, which had nearly exterminated salmon runs in
one of the rivers draining Olympic National Park. 215 But the Penobscot relicensing processes offered an
opportunity for a more systemic approach. Rather than considering each dam separately, the participants in
the Penobscot project decided to concurrently evaluate the status of all of PPL's dams in the lower Penobscot
basin. 216 That concurrent evaluation would afford them an opportunity to identify cost-effective ways to
rehabilitate the river's fisheries while retaining much of its hydropower. 217
In 2004, the participants ultimately were able to strike a deal. 218 For between twenty-four and twenty-six
million dollars (the actual price would depend on the timing of the purchase), the environmental partners
would purchase three dams. 219 Two would be removed. 220 The third would remain in place (upstream
landowners were deeply attached to the flatwater impoundment it created) but it would be decommissioned
and an innovative fish bypass facility would be installed. 221 Another upstream dam also would receive an
additional fish bypass facility. 222 In return for these environmental benefits, the environmental coalition
agreed to withhold opposition to the renewal of hydropower licenses at six remaining dams. Those dams
would either *1078 continue to produce hydropower at their current rate or would receive hydropower
upgrades. 223
The resulting environmental changes should be dramatic. While the exact amounts are difficult to calculate,
scientists anticipate that thousands of kilometers of river and stream habitat will become more accessible
to the stronger swimmers (like salmon and shad) in the river system. 224 For species that cannot negotiate

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

14

McKenzie, Colin 10/23/2017
For Educational Use Only

TRADING DAMS, 48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1043

fish ladders and rapids, fewer additional river miles will become available, but the percentage increase in
habitat will actually be much larger. 225
Numbers of increased fish are even more uncertain, but The Nature Conservancy's preliminary estimates
suggest that dramatic changes are likely. 226 The potential changes also extend beyond improved fisheries.
The removal of the Edwards Dam improved water quality, revitalized property values, and renewed
community interest in the riverfront. 227 Towns along the Penobscot already are anticipating, and planning
for, similar changes. 228
On their own, those benefits would establish the Penobscot Project as one of the nation's most ambitious
environmental restoration projects. But what sets the Penobscot Project apart is its impact, or lack thereof,
on hydropower generating capacity. 229 Had this been a simple dam removal project, approximately 100
megawatts of generating power would have come out. 230 That capacity might have been made up through
fossil fuel combustion or some other environmentally damaging source. But by moving turbines from one
of the decommissioned dams to one of the remaining dams, and by making several other adjustments,
the dam owners will avoid any significant *1079 reduction in hydropower generation. 231 In fact, recent
calculations have found that generating capacity has slightly increased. 232
What happened in the Penobscot Basin is not entirely unique. FERC has a long history of ordering off-site
mitigation to compensate for the impacts of new hydropower projects, and in some ways, the Penobscot
project just represents a more sophisticated and ambitious application of that concept. 233 On a few other
river basins, FERC also has considered multiple hydropower facilities in a single proceeding. 234 Indeed, a
major multi-dam proceeding might be nearing a resolution for the Klamath River, which for over a decade
has been one of the nation's most prominent water conflicts. 235 In the wake of the Penobscot project,
the federal government also has actively searched for other watersheds where basin-scale analyses might
generate more effective systems of watershed management. 236 Several agencies are currently pursuing a
pilot project on the Deschutes River in Oregon and beginning studies on the Connecticut and Roanoke River
basins. 237 Finally, ambitious basin-scale sustainable hydropower projects are underway on major river
systems in Africa and Central and South America. 238 Nevertheless, *1080 the Penobscot remains a gold
standard. To date, no river-basin project has done quite as effective a job of translating systemic planning
into action, or at combining sustained hydropower production with potentially huge improvements in
environmental quality.
III. DAMS AND THE FRONTIERS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TRADING
To us, and to many observers, the Penobscot Project seems worthy of imitation. 239 The opportunity for
imitation also exists, at least as a matter of ecology and engineering. 240 The key questions, then, are what
legal and economic conditions would facilitate such replication; whether those conditions are present for
dams; and, if they are not present, what reforms, if any, could remedy their absence.
Our answers to these questions turn on a key premise. While the Penobscot is a distinctive project, its
tradeoff between environmental improvements in some locations and hydropower upgrades in others
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reflects an increasingly familiar approach to environmental protection. On a small scale, the Penobscot
project created an environmental trading system. And while almost nothing has been written about applying
trading system concepts to dams, the Penobscot project illustrates the possibilities. 241 Our premise, then,
is that the lessons from several decades of environmental trading can help us assess whether trading dams
will be viable, and about what reforms might increase that viability. We therefore begin this section with
a background discussion of environmental trading systems, from which we extract general lessons for dam
trading, and we then focus on specific metrics of potential failure or success.
Before launching into that discussion, however, we offer a few words about what we mean by trading
dams. The concept could apply in several different scenarios. In the simplest, a dam owner might obtain
authorization to build, or continue operating, a dam in one location in return for removing a dam
somewhere else. 242 Somewhat more *1081 ambitiously, the trades could involve larger numbers of dams,
with sustained or increased dam operations in a larger set of locations traded for a larger set of coordinated
removal projects. 243 The Penobscot Project exemplifies that latter model. 244 Alternatively, the trades
might involve using dam removals to mitigate environmentally damaging activities, like wetlands filling
or other forms of habitat destruction, that don't involve dams. 245 Finally, and most ambitiously, dam
removals might be integrated into watershed-scale, multi-activity trading programs, in which a broad suite
of environmental restoration activities, including dam removal, offsets a broad range of economic activities,
including but not limited to dam operations. 246
*1082 Figure 1. A Simple Interbasin Trade
In return for constructing new Dam E on the river basin at the left, the construction company agrees to remove
dam D, which previously blocked the river basin at right. Because the new dam E will be located above two
other dams (which we assume, for purposes of illustration, already block fish passage), its environmental harm
will be more than balanced by the gain from opening up river system 2.

TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE
Before: Dams A, B, C, and D block fish passage on both rivers.

TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE
After: New Dam E has gone in, but old dam D has been removed, opening one whole river system to fish.
*1083 Figure 2. Trading Dam Removals for Other Activities
In return for obtaining authorization to fill a wetland area, the factory owners agree to fund the removal of an
upstream dam. If the value of increased river connectivity is greater than the damage done by the wetland fill,
then the trade should lead to improved environmental and economic outcomes.%

TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE
Before: The dam blocks the river, and the factory owners want to expand into the wetland area.
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TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE
After: The wetlands have been filled, and in return the factory owners fund dam removal.
*1084 We also envision dam trading achieving a variety of goals. In a basin where improved environmental
conditions are the primary goal, selective trading could help minimize the energy loss associated with
achieving that goal; dam owners could obtain the right to continue operating in more economically
desirable locations by agreeing to remove less economically valuable dams. 247 Conversely, in places
where government policy demands increases in hydropower capacity, dam trading could help planners
achieve their energy capacity goals, or at least most of them, while minimizing negative environmental
side effects. 248 In a place where increased renewable energy generation and improved environmental
quality both are important public policy goals, trading could help reconcile these two otherwise conflicting
priorities. In short, endorsing the possibility of a trading regime does not imply an associated endorsement
of a particular balance between hydropower generation and environmental protection.
A. The Evolution of Environmental Trading Systems
The reforms we advocate for dams can trace their intellectual roots to smokestacks and swamps. 249
Beginning in the early 1970s, regulators emphasized uniform standards for all analogous sources of
pollution. 250 But critics noted that uniform standards might be inefficient if, as is often the case, compliance
costs differ from source to source. 251 If regulators instead established overall caps on levels of pollution,
gave (or auctioned) regulated firms entitlements to pollute up to that cap, and allowed those regulated firms
to trade their entitlements, the same environmental outcomes might be achieved with greater economic
efficiency. 252 Firms *1085 that could abate pollution more cheaply could reduce their emissions more
than they otherwise would have been required to, and then could sell the “credits” created by the excess
reductions to firms for which pollution abatement would be more costly. 253 Compliance burdens, in other
words, would be allocated through trading to those firms that could shoulder those costs most cheaply.
In a relatively short time, this idea metamorphosed from a fringe critique into one of environmental law's
central policy innovations. 254 Regulators tested this concept at individual facilities, allowing increases in
pollution at one smokestack to be offset by reductions at another. 255 They soon expanded the concept
to allow trading among different and separately owned facilities. 256 They also allowed “banking,” which
means allowing regulated entities to trade excess reductions of pollution in the short term for more
generous allowances in the future. 257 Trading initially was quite controversial; in addition to concerns
about its efficacy, many environmentalists worried that trading systems implied a normative endorsement
of pollution, or the creation of “rights” to pollute. 258 But air quality trading programs became increasingly
prevalent, and they also appeared to succeed. 259 Trading programs have now become deeply entrenched,
and broadly supported, in the field of air quality regulation, and new regulatory programs for greenhouse
gas emissions often place central reliance upon this approach. 260 They also have generated some of
environmental law's most enduring academic debates.
*1086 Meanwhile, habitat protection programs were evolving along a similar trajectory. 261 Offsetting,
or “mitigating,” habitat degradation at one place or time with environmental improvements elsewhere
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had a long history in environmental regulation.With dams, for example, mitigation had been widely (and
often disastrously) used for decades, and dam builders often attempted to mitigate their dams' impacts by
constructing fish ladders and hatcheries. 262 But use of this approach accelerated with the emergence of
CWA Section 404, which prohibits unpermitted dredging and filling of wetlands and waterways. 263
The national wetlands policy implemented undersection 404 is somewhat like a cap-and-trade scheme.
The cap is a national policy against net loss of wetlands. 264 Pursuant to that policy, the Army Corps
of Engineers, which holds primary responsibility for implementing section 404, generally requires permit
applicants to avoid wetlands entirely, if possible, and to minimize any impacts that cannot be avoided. 265
For many development projects, however, some impact remains unavoidable, and stopping all of those
projects has never been a politically tenable option. The Army Corps instead has turned to compensatory
mitigation. 266 Sometimes that compensatory mitigation occurs through the permittee itself constructing or
restoring a substitute wetland, and sometimes it occurs through the payment of fees (referred to as in-lieu
fees) that support some other entity's wetland restoration work. 267 In other circumstances, private wetlands
mitigation “banks” create or restore wetlands and then sell credits to future developers. 268 *1087 In a
relatively short time, wetlands mitigation has become a billion-dollar industry. 269
While air quality and wetlands are the two most prominent examples of environmental trading systems,
variations on trading concepts now pervade environmental law. 270 Off-site mitigation, often involving
banking, is now central to the habitat conservation planning process under section ten of the ESA. 271
Transferable fishing quotas have become increasingly popular. 272 Advocates have argued that trading
systems can bring conservation into otherwise wasteful systems of water rights. 273 Many municipal
governments attempt to use tradable development rights to direct urban growth toward preferred
locations. 274 Though the trading systems vary considerably, the common foundation of nearly all of these
systems is a belief that allowing regulated entities to trade increased environmental degradation in some
locations for increased protection in others can be a more efficient and less intrusive way to conduct
environmental regulation. 275
Despite some successes, actual results have not always lived up to that theoretical promise. Wetlands
mitigation provides one prominent example: for years, plenty of trading occurred, but the constructed or
restored wetlands often offered poor compensation for the wetlands that had been lost. 276 In other contexts,
programs have failed to get started. The United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has been
promoting water quality trading systems for years, but the few programs that even exist have generated very
low volumes of trading. 277 In others, *1088 a lack of post-trade monitoring makes the program difficult
to evaluate. 278 And even with the programs most commonly hailed as successes, debate continues about
the extent of their success, and the reasons for it. 279
Trading also continues to generate more theoretical and normative critiques. One key objection is that
trading programs far too often involve trading things that are incommensurate, with environmental
protection typically on the losing end of the deal. 280 More broadly, some critics still argue that trading
entrenches a market-oriented worldview, in which environmental ethics are subordinated to utilitarian
calculations of profit. 281
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Those critiques have force, but the history of trading systems offers a third key lesson: the world of
environmental trading systems is not rigidly divided between successes and failures. Trading systems can
improve, and perhaps the best example of this improvement is the wetlands mitigation system. Originally,
EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers favored compensation through construction of on-site wetlands. 282
But the new wetlands often failed, in large part because their geographic isolation; a constructed wetland
surrounded by shopping mall parking is unlikely to thrive. 283 In response to those failures, the Corps has
moved toward systems that aggregate compensatory mitigation funds into larger accounts and use those
funds *1089 to restore and protect higher-value wetlands. 284 Mitigation experts generally agree that this
approach holds more promise. 285 That is just one change, of course, but the wetlands program also offers
other examples, 286 and in many other contexts, trading programs can improve as participants learn from
experience. 287
For dams, then, the still-unfolding story of environmental trading systems offers economic promise,
warning, and the possibility of learning. The promise remains the theoretical flexibility and cost savings
associated with trading systems, as well as their track record of success in some circumstances. 288 The
warning stems from their struggles and, sometimes, failures in other realms. Trading systems are useful
tools, but not for every problem, and not unless they are designed and implemented with care. 289 And the
possibility of learning should provide some reassurance that dam trading, even if initially tentative, limited,
and sometimes unsuccessful, can evolve--if the first experiments begin.
B. Metrics of Success
Beyond these general lessons, the history of environmental trading systems provides several metrics
by which to evaluate their potential utility for dams. In our view, three categories of metrics are
particularly important. The first is the presence of legal authorization for trading systems. Without such
authorization, trading is simply not possible. The second is the presence of sufficient incentives, both legal
and economic (the two are highly intertwined), for the relevant actors to engage in trading. Third, to function
effectively, most trading systems require abundant information, both about the things to be traded and the
environmental and social consequences of those trades. Absent that *1090 information, trading systems
are likely to be economically or environmentally dysfunctional. Below, we explain and apply each of these
metrics.
1. Authorization
Perhaps the clearest bar to an environmental trading system is the absence of legal authorization to engage
in trading. Almost any trading system will be implemented by government agencies, and those agencies only
can use the regulatory tools given unto them by law. That might seem like a rather obvious point, but it
remains an important one; in recent years, EPA has lost court cases because judges were convinced that the
agency's trading systems were contrary to governing statutes. 290
For dams, which are often embedded in complex legal webs constructed without any thought of trading,
this lesson might seem daunting. Nevertheless, there are few general prohibitions to trading in those laws.
Instead, many existing provisions and established practices could provide foundations for increased use
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of dam trading. The Federal Power Act's mandate for license approvals to comport with “comprehensive
plans” provides an obvious foundation for the planning that would precede development of trading
systems. 291 Similarly, FERC's established, and occasionally used, practice of consolidating multiple
licensing proceedings would provide an opportunity for more systemic decision-making. 292 Indeed, on
future licenses, FERC could draw upon another existing practice, including reopener clauses in licenses,
to align the timing of licensing proceedings throughout a river basin. 293 FERC already allows off-site
mitigation, and extending that practice to encompass dam-removal mitigation banks also would be a logical
next step. 294 For state-regulated dams, the potential toolbox is even larger. And we have not uncovered any
state *1091 laws that would preclude state-regulated dam owners from participating in trading systems.
The greatest complexities would likely arise with congressionally authorized, federally owned dams. If
Congress has authorized the creation of a dam for a specific purpose, then additional congressional action
might be necessary to authorize that same dam's removal. 295 But even that limitation would not preclude
the inclusion of federally owned dams in a trading scheme, for federal dam managers could still compensate
for the impacts of their dams by funding removals of other dams in other locations. 296 In fact, given the
scale of the impacts caused by federal dams, those federal agencies could become major buyers. 297
2. Levers and Incentives
A more complicated story emerges from the incentive structures applicable to dam trading. Environmental
trades almost always occur becausesome combination of regulatory leverage and financial incentives
induces a redirection of environmentally harmful behavior. 298 But for dams, these levers and incentives
are limited. That need not preclude trading, but the negative signals make it less likely and offer promising
targets for reform.
a. Stakes
One of the most important sources of both leverage and incentive is the presence of high economic and
environmental stakes. Simply put, something that is not economically valuable is not likely to be traded.
Any such system creates transaction costs, and some economic value is necessary to make shouldering those
costs worthwhile. Similarly, if the environmental stakes are low, there will be little reason to create the
regulatory structures necessary to support a trading system.
*1092 The importance of high stakes also may seem rather obvious, but it is worth emphasizing for a simple
reason. With dams, the economic stakes are not accidental byproducts of some invisible hand, but instead
are determined in large part by law.Energy markets are heavily subsidized and sometimes heavily regulated,
and the combination of subsidies, regulatory constraints, and regulatory exemptions plays a significant role
in determining prices. 299 If competing energy sources like coal and oil can continue to externalize many
of their environmental costs, their prices will remain relatively low, and hydropower's competitive position
will suffer. 300 But if climate regulation or even more traditional Clean Air Act implementation leads to
tougher controls on fossil fuel emissions, the economic appeal of hydropower should rise. 301 Similarly, if
more states adopt renewable portfolio standards or other energy pricing incentives that include hydropower,
then energy suppliers will be willing to pay a premium for hydropower. 302 Those changes in turn should
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accelerate interest in upgrading dams and other waterworks. 303 That could simply entrench existing dams,
even if their environmental impacts are substantial. But increases in the economic value of hydropower also
could generate profits that then could be tapped to support environmental mitigation. In short, the fate of
dam trading is closely linked to climate and energy policy more generally, and among the many potential
benefits of more progressive energy laws could be a more dynamic approach to dams.
The importance of high stakes does come with one caveat: for the trading system to work, those stakes
cannot be equally high everywhere. If every dam has a similar ratio of social benefit to environmental harm,
there will be little to gain from trades. 304 Only where significant disparities exist--in other words, where
some dams produce much more positive social value for each increment of environmental harm than others-will there be an incentive to trade upgrades or maintenance at *1093 the higher value dams for removals
at the lower-value sites. For dams, such disparities of value clearly do exist. 305 In general, larger dams tend
to produce more positive and negative impacts than smaller ones. But the relationships are not uniform,
and the American landscape is heavily populated with dams that produce significant environmental impacts
while providing few public benefits, if any at all. 306
In short, the stakes already weigh in favor of dam trading. And if energy and environmental law generally
move toward greater regulation of greenhouse gas emissions or conventional air pollutants, the stakes could
become even more favorable.
b. Regulatory Leverage
While high stakes and disparities in value are necessary for a successful trading regime, they are by no means
sufficient. Potential traders will generally need additional incentives for participation, and those incentives
generally come from some combination of regulatory sticks and financial carrots. With dams, some of those
sticks and carrots exist, but the resulting incentives are mixed and uneven.
The importance of carrots and sticks arises from a simple problem: Often an activity that has high costs
for society as a whole does not have high costs for the people actually engaged in that activity, usually
because the actors are able to externalize those costs. Until those costs become the focus of either regulatory
limitations, positive financial incentives, or both, the actors will have little reason to participate in a trading
scheme. That simple principle explains why a regulatory cap is a key element of most environmental trading
schemes: it is the simplest, though by no means the only, way of creating that regulatory push.
Dam management is by no means immune from this need for incentives. A high-environmental-impact,
low-value, non-powered dam might seem like an optimal candidate for participation in a trading scheme
designed to encourage upgrades or removals. But if the dam's owner does not bear the cost of those
environmental impacts, his participation in a trading scheme is unlikely. 307 The incentives are even lower
if the dam owner faces *1094 no safety-related obligations, does not pay to insure the dam, and (as is
entirely plausible in some states) does not even need to provide public information about the dam. 308 For
that reason, some regulatory compulsion for dam owners to internalize the negative impacts of their dams
is a key element of a successful trading scheme. 309
Existing dam law does an uneven job of providing those incentives. No federal or state law creates an
overall cap on any of the environmental impacts of dams, and environmental limits instead derive from
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a patchwork of legal obligations. Those obligations are strongest during FERC relicensing processes,
when the combination of extensive procedural requirements and multiple environmental law levers
creates a powerful incentive for dam owners to consider whether continued operation of a dam really
is worthwhile. 310 But even the FERC process contains countervailing incentives, including a default
preference toward preserving dams, and FERC itself has been reluctant to actually order dam removals. 311
Recent congressional changes have been designed primarily to weaken regulatory leverage over dams,
and those changes undermine dam owners' incentives to account for their projects' negative effects. 312 In
the long periods between licensing processes, the incentives toward maintaining the status quo are even
more powerful. 313 Unless FERC or another regulatory agency invokes a “reopener” clause and reconsiders
license terms, dam owners are largely exempt from regulatory reexamination during those long interim
periods. 314 Consequently, a set of moderately favorable incentives can exist, but only once every several
decades.
For federal dams that are not regulated by FERC, the incentives toward maintaining the status quo are
similar, if not more powerful.No relicensing process exists, and once Congress authorizes a federally *1095
owned dam, the default presumption is that it will remain in place. 315 Indeed, making significant changes
to dam operations might actually be precluded by the dam's authorizing legislation. 316 Nor does any
statute prescribe a process for concurrently evaluating the status of multiple dams, and therefore considering
how multi-dam systems might be realigned. That does not mean that federal dams, once built, are exempt
from regulatory oversight. Perhaps most importantly, dam operations remain subject to the ESA, and
consultation processes may lead to significant new constraints. 317 But both procedural and substantive
levers for reconsidering dam operations are significantly weaker than they are for FERC-regulated dams.
For state-regulated dams, those levers are generally weakest of all. As discussed above, few states have
any procedural requirement for re-examining the environmental impacts of existing dams--unless someone
proposes to make a change to the dam. 318 In many states, substantive environmental constraints on those
operations are similarly sparse; while a few states have potentially important environmental requirements
for existing dams, in many those dams' environmental impacts are largely unregulated. 319 Safety regulation
could be a substitute incentive, but in many states, that regulation exists largely on paper. 320 That does
not mean state dam owners are entirely immune to legal leverage. Even absent coverage under regulatory
programs, the potential tort liability associated with a failing dam might be incentive enough for a landowner
to take some action. 321 The willingness of government agencies and environmental groups to pay for
dam removal also provides an important lever, though one limited by the sizes of government and private
purses. 322 But the reality in many states is that *1096 the path of least resistance, even for a dam with
high environmental impacts and very little social value, is to simply leave it in place.
Incentives to upgrade dams, and add additional or new hydropower capacity, are stronger but still quite
uneven. The potential profits from electricity sales are one incentive, particularly where renewable incentive
programs elevate the price for that electricity. 323 Similarly, recent federal interest in new hydropower
capacity may spur some development. 324 But we found very few legal processes designed to promote the
positive externalities of hydropower. FERC, for example, does not tell its relicensing applicants, “your
equipment is old and underperforming, and we won't grant this license unless you make changes to generate
more hydropower.” Nor do dams, or other renewable energy projects, get any special treatment through
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NEPA or ESA processes because of their potential benefits for air quality and climate. 325 Similarly, few,
if any, states have programs designed to identify promising locations for new hydropower installations
or upgrades. 326 Consequently, dam owners' easiest course of action is often to preserve not just the
environmental but also the energy status quo.
The consequence of these uneven incentives is a fragmented regulatory terrain only weakly conducive to
trading. The FERC process does provide relatively strong incentives, and when the relicensing process is
impending or in progress, dam owners might be particularly interested in identifying other dam removals
that could serve as mitigation. 327 And there might be many other dams nearby that could be part of an
environmentally and economically sensible deal. But without substantial increases in, and adjustments to,
regulatory oversight, the other dam owners will have little regulatory incentive to participate in such deals,
even if their dams produce little economic or societal value, and are likely to become involved only if the
offering price is sufficiently high. Sometimes it may be, but both private and public funds for environmental
restoration are fairly limited. Consequently, while the Penobscot project succeeded largely because many
dams were part of the discussion, the existing regulatory system misses most opportunities for recreating
that circumstance.
*1097 3. Information
A third key element in the success of almost any trading scheme is governmental procurement, management,
and dissemination of information. For dam trading, that poses a serious challenge, and, again, a potential
focus for reforms.
The claim that trading systems necessitate information management may initially sound surprising, for
some of the early literature on trading suggested otherwise. Much like other market systems, the thinking
went, a trading system could draw upon the knowledge of many dispersed actors, significantly reducing the
knowledge burdens placed upon centralized government regulators. 328 Decades later, however, the bloom
is off that rose. Regulators have learned that setting the initial rules for trading systems, determining whether
trades actually would be environmentally protective, and verifying that traders are following through
on their commitments all can be information-intensive exercises. 329 Without the requisite information, a
trading system can fail to fulfill its environmentally protective goals, or can simply collapse. 330
The informational challenges of environmental trading systems derive largely from the necessity of trading
incommensurable things. 331 Most of the items that environmental traders deal are not fully fungible. For
air pollutants, for example, location usually matters; a decrease in emissions in a downwind area may
not offset an increase farther upwind, even if the amounts are exactly the same. 332 For wetlands and
habitat trading programs, the non-fungibility problems are even more acute. 333 No two wetlands, forests,
or meadows are exactly the same, and a wide variety of geographic, ecological, and social factors will
determine whether the habitat that is created or preserved offers reasonable compensation for the habitat
destroyed. 334 That creates a *1098 potentially enormous challenge for trading systems: how does one
obtain and process the information necessary to determine whether trades are adequate, or compensate for
that information's absence?
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Existing trading programs address these issues in several ways, each somewhat flawed. One is to measure
trades by using some simple currency--pounds of CO2e, 335 for example, or acres of wetlands--and to ignore
any incommensurability that the currency fails to capture. 336 That approach lowers transaction costs,
but, unfortunately, it also can routinely place environmental protection on the losing side of deals. 337
Alternatively, regulators can establish trading ratios--that is, they can require 10 acres of protection for
each acre of loss, to compensate for potential unevenness--or they can review each trade to make sure it
offers fair value. 338 Both approaches offer better assurances of environmental protection, but the costs to
regulated entities are higher. 339 Indeed, if the regulators' information demands are sufficiently high, deals
may not be worth pursuing at all.
These informational complexities raise a related challenge: addressing them often requires specialized
expertise. There are some environmental trading systems that function like an economist's idealized market,
with arms-length, low-transaction cost deals somewhat akin to traditional stock or bond trades. 340 But even
those markets require tremendous effort to create. In other environmental trading systems--wetlands again
are a good example--each trade tends to require oversight and review. 341 That in turn creates the need for
experience-based knowledge, both among the traders and the *1099 regulators. 342 Traders will need the
ability to predict what sort of deal will be approved, lest the system be untenably uncertain, and regulators
will need some basis for judging quickly whether a trade is satisfactory, lest they approve unreasonable deals
or drive up costs by making slow decisions. These problems are not insurmountable, but addressing them
takes time and effort.
For dam trading, these informational challenges are potentially substantial. Each dam is embedded in
a unique context, and the significant effects, both positive and negative, of dam removals will generally
ensure the need for ample information about any potential trade. The intricacies of river ecology contribute
to those complexities, and the webs of human interests associated with dams also can take time to sort
out.Particularly in western states, where water is relatively scarce, dams are likely to be embedded in complex
legal regimes of property rights in water and land. 343 Even beyond those rights, the normal human tendency
to view a river or a reservoir as a community resource creates a need to gather information about, inform,
and respond to public preferences. 344 Dam trading also is an almost completely new concept (and our
recent emphasis on dam removal isn't much older), and that too creates challenges. Agency guidance on dam
trading is nearly non-existent, and the decades-long learning processes that inform air quality and wetlands
trading have barely begun to occur. 345 Even with the Penobscot project as a potential model, any entity
embarking on a dam trading exercise would still be a pioneer.
Nevertheless, these challenges could become more manageable. Perhaps most importantly, scientists and
engineers can analyze river systems in ways that weren't possible twenty or thirty years ago. 346 *1100
Using geographic information systems and computer-based modeling, water resource planners have begun
creating prioritization maps that identify dams that ought to be prime ecological candidates for removal. 347
Other studies have moved beyond single-dam prioritization lists and developed optimization systems, which
are designed to identify what sequence of dam changes will best balance competing goals. 348 Several
more recent studies have broadened the scope of the analysis, attempting to identify environmental and
hydropower opportunities throughout entire river basins. 349 All of these trends reflect water planners'
increasing reliance on sophisticated basin-scale modeling, which can allow planners to identify management

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

24

McKenzie, Colin 10/23/2017
For Educational Use Only

TRADING DAMS, 48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1043

approaches that optimize multiple competing goals. 350 The changes also aren't just technocratic. As dam
removals become increasingly prevalent, communities are beginning to appreciate the values associated with
restoring free-flowing rivers. 351
The resulting studies could benefit dam trading operations in multiple ways. Initially, they could help
identify dams that should be targets for mitigation or upgrades. 352 That identification might be done by
the potential traders themselves or by third-party advocacy organizations. Alternatively, regulators might
use basin-scale modeling to help pre-define the rules of a trading system. By identifying targeted locations
for mitigation projects, and by predetermining the credits *1101 associated with those projects, they could
create greater certainty for future traders, lowering the transaction costs and accelerating the operations of
the trading system. 353 Alternatively, modeling might help regulators define more sophisticated currencies
for dam trading systems. By moving beyond relatively simple metrics, like river miles, and instead using
metrics that integrate multiple values, regulators might direct system participants toward higher-value
trades.
For trading to succeed, however, sophisticated informational tools are certainly not enough. Potential
traders also need guidance on how that information base would be integrated into regulatory decisionmaking. Here, as well, some nascent efforts show promise. Perhaps the most intriguing comes from North
Carolina, where state environmental agencies and the Army Corps of Engineers have begun to develop
trading ratios when dam removal projects are used as mitigation for filling streams. 354 Their initiative was
limited (and short-lived); 355 they only contemplated trades in which dam removals would create credits
for filling streams, and not for other activities like maintaining other existing dams. 356 But the basic
concept could be refined and extended to other forms of trades; for example, similar guidance could govern
trades in which dam removal compensates for other habitat-impacting activities. 357 These initial efforts
are just a beginning; the decades-long and still-ongoing process of developing the wetlands trading program
demonstrates just how much guidance and experience may ultimately be necessary. 358 But they still provide
promising signs.
In conclusion, the need for information creates big challenges and important reform opportunities for dam
management. With rare *1102 exceptions, existing informational systems are not robust enough to support
extensive trading. And some informational challenges probably always will remain; environmental trades
involving dams will always face more friction than those involving sulfur dioxide emissions, for example, and
the unique context of each dam will necessitate some site-specific tailoring of each trade. But a combination
of evolving information technology and increasing experience could make information demands less of a
barrier, particularly if regulators take active steps toward developing a stronger informational base.
IV. INTEGRATING REFORMS: A MODEL PROGRAM
The preceding discussion identifies a variety of challenges and implies many reforms. To bring our reform
ideas into focus, we therefore close with a sketch of a model reform program. For several reasons, we focus
on states (though some analogous changes could occur at the federal level). First, state dam laws have
tremendous room for improvement. As discussed above, state dam law is often highly underdeveloped, and
what law exists is not always implemented in any meaningful way. 359 Second, in the literature on dams,
states have received the least attention. Consequently, while we think promising reforms could and should
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occur at the federal level, 360 the prescriptions that follow explain what a thoughtful state might do with
its dams.
If implemented, the reforms below should help facilitate the trading of dams. But, as we have discussed,
dam trading will still present *1103 challenges, and improvements in dam management would be possible
even in the absence of trades. For that reason, we have emphasized reforms that would encourage trading
but would also produce more sensible dam management even if true trading systems do not emerge.
A. Environmental Regulation
An effective dam policy requires regulatory sticks, and on that front states have ample room for
improvement. At a minimum, a state dam regulatory program ought to include three elements.
The first, and most important, step would be to create environmental performance requirements for
existing dams. While states might choose to establish lower performance standards for existing facilities,
or might choose to phase those requirements in, there is no compelling reason to grant environmentally
destructive facilities near-permanent exemptions from environmental law. 361 Second, and relatedly, the
state should create periodic procedural opportunities for re-examining the status of dams. Here, the FERC
relicensing process provides a useful starting point, though shorter license terms would be preferable, as
would schedules creating concurrent review processes for all dams within a watershed. 362 Rivers, dams, and
societal needs all change over time, and a relicensing process provides a valuable opportunity to examine
whether a dam still makes sense, or whether it should be operated differently, or removed.Third, and finally,
the state should have a meaningful dam safety program that actually gets implemented. 363 Dams do fail,
sometimes with tragic consequences, and a failure to monitor dam conditions therefore is a public safety
problem as well as a missed opportunity to reconsider dams' existence or operations. 364
All of these recommendations might raise one question: do states have the power to make these changes?
Legally, at least, the answer should be a clear yes. Dams and the associated water rights do implicate
systems of property law, and to many people, property rights connote permanence. 365 But property rights
nearly always are subject to *1104 reasonable regulation, and that has been particularly true of rights
that implicate water resources and wildlife. 366 Dams themselves fall well within that tradition. Even at the
time of the Founding Fathers, statutes requiring fish passage and, sometimes, dam removals were quite
prevalent. 367 James Madison himself sponsored one such law, and the Framers appeared to view those
laws as entirely compatible with property law. 368 That compatibility should persist to the present day, and
should offer states ample latitude for more robust regulatory governance. 369
B. Information
While legal constraints are essential to the success of any trading schemes, softer forms of regulation also
have key roles to play. Most importantly, a reform-minded state could improve its dam policy by providing
more information about dams.
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A model dam information program would include several elements. At the most basic levels, states could
maintain more thorough dam inventories, which include the results of recent environmental and safety
reviews, and make the information in those inventories publicly available. States also could work with
federal agencies and non-profits, many of which already are engaged in mapping projects to identify fish
passage impediments and sites with hydropower potential, to make the results of their studies available online. 370 And, more ambitiously, *1105 states could sponsor and disseminate (or require dam owners to
fund) basin-scale dam optimization studies, and could make those studies available for public review. 371
All of these changes still would leave information gaps, for the complexity of river systems would ensure that
some key information is left out. But they would at least provide would-be dam traders with information
about which dams to target and which people to contact.
C. Trading System Guidance
The state also could provide informational support in another key way. Established environmental trading
systems often are supported by detailed, pre-specified rules and ample agency guidance. 372 The Army
Corps of Engineers and EPA, for example, have spent years refining and explaining their approaches
to wetlands mitigation, and the resulting guidance has helped create predictability and build public- and
private-sector expertise. 373 If dam trading is to succeed, a similar level of effort will be necessary.
States could offer that guidance in several ways. First, following the recent example of North Carolina, they
could pre-specify generic currencies and trading ratios for mitigation projects involving dam removals. 374
Second, they could study river basins, identify potential removal and upgrade sites, and establish basinspecific or even dam-specific trading ratios. Third, if states decide that pre-set currencies and trading ratios
are too crude to capture the environmental complexities of dam systems, they at least could set forth criteria
and procedures for reviewing potential trades. Absent that sort of guidance, each dam trade will be a oneoff exercise, with all the time, costs, and risks associated with doing something almost completely new. With
it, potential trade participants will at least have a set of structured expectations and a starting point for
institutional learning.
For the state, fulfilling this recommendation will not be easy. Any set of trading system rules will necessarily
ignore some of the complexity of the real world, and thus will allow traders to dismiss some *1106
consequences that reasonable people would care about. 375 For that reason, the scientists involved in basinscale studies often seem quite reluctant to translate any of their recommendations into policy prescriptions.
But some messiness is an unavoidable component of any regulatory system, including the status quo. 376
The key question, then, is not whether a trading system would involve serious flaws; no doubt it would.
Instead, it is whether trades could improve on existing legal systems that leave a problematic status quo
largely entrenched. The answer to that question might well be yes, and until innovations are tested, no one
will know.
D. Institutional Support
Implicit in all the suggestions we have made thus far are two more recommendations. First, the state needs
to have people who come to work thinking about improved dam systems. Second, the state needs to pay
for those people's work.
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The former recommendation is important because dam regulation requires policy innovation, and
innovation is not the sort of thing that can be automated. Instead, all of the steps we have described
require human expertise and judgment. And these steps are just the tip of the iceberg, for implementing
an improved dam removal program will necessarily require working with other state agencies, federal
agencies, local governments and communities, water users, the hydropower industry, other dam owners,
and environmental non-profits. The track records of state dam programs bear this out. It is no coincidence
states with particularly robust dam removal programs (Pennsylvania, for example) have had environmental
agency staff assigned to dam management. 377
The latter recommendation follows from the former. In an era of limited general funds, one cannot simply
assume that financial support for dam management will magically appear, and we recommend that our
model state consider alternative funding mechanisms. One *1107 possibility is a general dam ownership
fee, which could be pro-rated to the scale of the dam. An alternative possibility is a revolving loan fund,
which would use planning to support a mixed program of dam removals and hydropower upgrades, and
then use some of the profits from the hydropower upgrades to replenish the fund and support new rounds
of hydropower planning. A third, and more ambitious, possibility would be to impose a fee requirement on
some other related activity, like energy use or water consumption. Obviously all of these possibilities have
their strengths and weaknesses, but the key point is that our state should avoid the circumstance, presently
quite common for dam safety programs, in which a superficially robust program languishes for lack of
financial support. 378
E. Pricing Incentives
So far, our recommendations have focused primarily on increasing environmental constraints upon existing
dams. That is appropriate, for those constraints are presently too weak, but positive incentives also have
a role to play. Some of the most important incentives involve creating a favorable economic environment
for environmentally sensitive hydropower.
There are several ways to do this. One is to ensure that the environmental impacts of other energy sources
are adequately regulated. Every subsidy or exemption directed at the fossil fuel industry, for example,
effectively negates an economic edge that hydropower ought to receive. 379 Similarly, any regulatory
program that prices greenhouse gas emissions, like the northeastern states' Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative or California's AB 32 program, will create collateral benefits for hydropower. 380 An alternative,
or perhaps complementary, mechanism is to pass a renewable portfolio standard that includes sustainable
hydropower and to use environmental performance, not size, as the key criterion for inclusion in that
standard. 381 Massachusetts already has modeled this approach, and its *1108 innovation encourages
hydropower while also providing incentives to generate that hydropower in relatively sustainable ways. 382
***
These reform proposals hardly exhaust the field. But a state that adopts the program we have described
would be taking huge steps toward a more progressive dam policy, in which exchanges like the Penobscot
River Restoration Project help lead to more sensible uses of rivers and dams.
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CONCLUSION
In a sense, the dams of the Penobscot River all are relics of an earlier age. The United States stopped building
dams during the Reagan Administration, and in recent decades, there have been few serious proposals
for large-scale dam construction to resume. 383 Nevertheless, the United States Department of Energy has
begun taking bold steps toward a hydropower revival, and that revival, if it does materialize, could involve
extensive new construction. 384
Meanwhile, in much of the rest of the world, dam building never really ceased. Hundreds of dams, many of
them enormous, are currently planned across South America, Asia, and Africa. Many national governments
view those planned dams as integral components of their economic development strategies, and while the
judgments informing these views are sometimes slanted or dubious, the plans nevertheless are quite real. If
those dams are sited and built without regard to environmental impacts--in other words, if they are built
the same way the dams on the Penobscot, and throughout much of the rest of the United States, were--the
ecological consequences will be devastating.
The dam laws of other nations are not the subject of this Article; our discussion instead has focused almost
entirely upon the United States. But the still-unfolding international age of dams highlights the importance
of any successful United States reforms. If some *1109 hydropower development is inevitable, then there
is a glaring and urgent need for legal mechanisms that will reduce the impacts of those dams that are built.
Environmental trading systems could be one such mechanism. And there is precedent for imitation, for the
United States' pioneering experiments with environmental trading systems have now influenced regulatory
approaches around the world. 385 Dams, then, could be the next frontier.
We do not claim that crossing that frontier will be easy. Trading systems will never be a perfect fit for dams,
or for river management more generally. Nor will they be fully effective upon first emergence; in this realm,
as in most areas of regulatory policy, learning will take time. But the restoration of the Penobscot illustrates
how the concept of trading holds promise.
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some of the FPA's requirements. Id. § 2705 (2013).

115

See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.

116

FERC-regulated dams tend to be larger than non-hydropower dams and smaller than federally owned dams.
See HALL & REEVES, supra note 61, at v.

117

See 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828c (2013); see also J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 2217, 2235-36, 2258-60 (2005) (describing passage of the statute and later amendments).

118

See 16 U.S.C. § 800 (2013) (setting procedures for preliminary licenses), 802 (informational requirements for
license applications); id. § 808 (2013) (license renewals); id. § 820 (2013) (license revocations).

119

See 16 U.S.C. §§ 797(e), 803 (2013).

120

See, e.g., id. § 821 (2013) (partially preempting and partially preserving state authority); California v. Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 495 U.S. 490, 497, 506 (1990) (concluding that section 821 preserves state authority over
water rights but not state authority to require instream flows).

121

See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 117, at 2236-41.

122

Id. at 2243 (“A biologist working at FERC at the time described the package of incentives as a license to print
money for hydropower.”).

123

Michael C. Blumm & Viki A. Nadol, The Decline of the Hydropower Czar and the Rise of Agency Pluralism in
Hydroelectric Licensing, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 81, 87-96 (2001); DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 117, at
2252-63.

124

Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-495, § 3(a), 100 Stat. 1243 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 797(e) (2006)) (granting federal land management agencies authority to impose conditions for projects
located within their reservations); 16 U.S.C. § 803(j) (2013) (allowing the FWS and NMFS to request conditions
designed “to adequately and equitably protect, mitigate damages to, and enhance, fish and wildlife”); id. § 811
(2013) (“The Commission shall require... such fishways as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior or
the Secretary of Commerce, as appropriate.”). In theory, FERC was obligated to consult with other agencies
prior to 1986, but it “did so rather half-heartedly, at best.” DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 117, at 2223.
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125

42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2013).

126

16 U.S.C. §§ 1536, 1538 (2013).

127

See 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (2013); see also PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700,
722-23 (1994).

128

E.g.,PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty., 511 U.S. at 722-23; Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission
Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 772 (1984) (holding that FERC must include in its licenses conditions imposed pursuant
to FPA section 4(e)); Am. Rivers v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 201 F.3d 1186, 1206-11 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding that FWS's and NMFS's fishway prescriptions are mandatory).

129

See generally DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 117 (documenting the effectiveness of lobbying by other agencies).

130

See, e.g., Jeff Crane, “Setting the River Free”: The Removal of the Edwards Dam and the Restoration of the
Kennebec River, 1 WATER HIST. 131, 135-43 (2009) (explaining circumstances that led to negotiations over
and then removal of the Edwards Dam).

131

16 U.S.C. § 799 (2013) (“Licenses under this subchapter shall be issued for a period not exceeding fifty years.”).

132

See FED. ENERGY REG. COMM'N, HYDROPOWER LICENSING AND ENDANGERED SPECIES: A
GUIDE FOR APPLICANTS, CONTRACTORS, AND STAFF 53 (2001) (providing a standard “reopener”
clause for fish and wildlife protection).

133

See Cal. Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 472 F.3d 593, 594-95 (9th Cir. 2006)
(concluding that despite the existence of a “re-opener clause,” ongoing operations under a valid FERC license
did not require consultation).

134

See 16 U.S.C. § 808(a)(1) (2013).

135

See id. §§ 797(e), 811 (2013) (creating an entitlement “to a determination on the record, after opportunity for
an agency trial-type hearing of no more than 90 days, on any disputed issues of material fact with respect to”
conditions or fishway requirements).

136

See Adell Louise Amos, Hydropower Reform and the Impact of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 on the Klamath
Basin: Renewed Optimism or Same Old Song?, 22 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 9-13 (2007).

137

See id. at 27-29 (describing the hearings for the Klamath project).

138

INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON IMPROVING HYDROPOWER LICENSING PROCESSES,
GUIDELINES TO CONSIDER FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE ALTERNATIVE LICENSING
PROCESS 1 (2000); OFFICE OF ENERGY PROJECTS, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM'N, IDEAS FOR
IMPLEMENTING AND PARTICIPATING IN THE INTEGRATED LICENSING PROCESS (ILP) 5
(2011).

139

FED. ENERGY REG. COMM'N, POLICY STATEMENT ON HYDROPOWER LICENSING
SETTLEMENTS P 2 (2006) (“[T]he Commission looks with great favor on settlements in licensing cases.”).

140

Applications for New Licenses (Relicenses), FED. ENERGY REG. COMM'N, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/
hydropower/gen-info/licensing/app-new.asp (last updated Sept. 5, 2014) (“At least 5 years before a license
expires, the licensee must file a notice of intent declaring whether or not it intends to seek a new license (relicense)
for its project.”).

141

See generally Blumm & Nadol, supra note 123 (documenting the historical and legal context of this shift).
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142

We based this assertion on our own experience and on informal discussions with experienced hydropower
attorneys.

143

There are rare exceptions to this generalization. See infra note 234 and accompanying text.

144

16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(1) (2013). Some other agencies that participate in relicensing processes also have planning
mandates, and those plans could provide broader frameworks for dam decisions. See, e.g., id. § 1533(f) (2013)
(providing for endangered species recovery plans).

145

See, e.g., Great Lakes Hydro Am., LLC, 102 FERC 61018, 61028 (2003) (describing a consolidated proceeding).

146

See D.H. Cole, Reviving the Federal Power Act's Comprehensive Plan Requirement: A History of Neglect and
Prospects for the Future, 16 ENVTL. L. 639, 652-61 (1986).

147

As of November 25, 2013, a search of Westlaw's database of FERC decisions for the term “consolidated licensing
proceeding” produced eleven hits. Other decisions may use different terms, and this number therefore probably
understates the number of consolidated proceedings, but it nevertheless indicates their rarity.

148

Many key FERC documents do not even mention the possibility of more comprehensive proceedings. See, e.g.,
FED. ENERGY REG. COMM'N, HANDBOOK FOR HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT LICENSING AND
5 MW EXEMPTIONS FROM LICENSING (2004) (containing no mention of consolidated proceedings).

149

See 16 U.S.C. § 817 (2013) (requiring “any person, State, or municipality” constructing a hydroelectric facility
on navigable waterways to obtain a license, but not extending that requirement to other federal agencies).

150

HALL & REEVES, supra note 61, at 8. Two agencies--the Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of
Reclamation--own over three quarters of those dams. Id.

151

See id. at 2.

152

See Victor B. Flatt & Jeremy M. Tarr, Adaptation, Legal Resiliency, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers:
Managing Water Supply in a Climate-Altered World, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1499, 1516-29 (2011) (summarizing the
legal regime governing the Army Corps' dams).

153

See, e.g.,In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160, 1167-78 (11th Cir. 2011) (describing the complex
historical and legal saga of the Buford Dam).

154

33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2013) (extending coverage only to projects that receive “a Federal license or permit”).

155

These laws apply because they are triggered by discretionary federal actions and altering dam operations, which
dam managers must do from time to time, involves discretion.

156

See NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., BIOLOGICAL
OPINION FOR THE CONTINUED OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF ENGLEBRIGHT DAM
AND RESERVOIR, DAGUERRE POINT DAM, AND RECREATIONAL FACILITIES ON AND
AROUND ENGLEBRIGHT RESERVOIR 220 (2012) (demanding fish passage at two major dams on
California's Yuba River). The subsequent history of the dispute offers a cautionary tale, however. The 2012
biological opinion was later withdrawn. See S. Yuba River Citizens League v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No.
2:13-CV-00059-MCE, 2013 WL 4094777, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2013) (describing the status of the biological
opinion and subsequent litigation). A replacement biological opinion published in 2014 is much narrower in its
analytical scope and its proposed requirements. See NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., NAT'L OCEANIC
& ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR THE OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
OF DAGUERRE POINT DAM AND FISH LADDERS 11-26 (2014).
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157

See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 2309a (2013) (providing that authorization).

158

For example, the lowermost dams in California's American River watershed--the Nimbus and Folsom Dams-are operated by the Bureau of Reclamation. SeeFolsom Dam, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, http://
www.usbr.gov/projects/Facility.jsp?fac_Name=Folsom+Dam (last updated June 4, 2009); Nimbus Dam, U.S.
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, http:// www.usbr.gov/projects/Facility.jsp?fac_Name=Nimbus+Dam (last
updated June 4, 2009). Those dams and their reservoirs prevent fish from migrating to the upper parts of the
American River watershed, which contains many non-federal hydropower dams. SeeUpper American River
Watershed, SACRAMENTO RIVER WATERSHED PROGRAM, http:// www.sacriver.org/aboutwatershed/
roadmap/watersheds/american/upper-american-river-watershed (last visited Sept. 19, 2014).

159

See supra notes 113-57 and accompanying text. The sources cited here, though there are many, are just the tip
of the iceberg.

160

Not all hydroelectric dams are large. See HALL ET AL., supra note 63, at 7 (“[T]he vast majority of hydroelectric
plants are small or very small plants.”).

161

See supra notes 74-92 and accompanying text.

162

The contrast between Wisconsin, which funds a dam removal grant program and Texas, where laws can make
even finding information about a dam difficult, is one of many possible examples of these differences. See Dam
Removal Grant Program, WIS. DEP'T OF NATURAL RES., http:// dnr.wi.gov/Aid/DamRemoval.html (last
modified Oct. 14, 2013); infra note 175 and accompanying text (describing Texas laws).

163

See, e.g., Jason J. Kelroy, Comment, Can We Get that Dam Thing out of Here?: An Analysis of Potential Dam
Removal Options in Wisconsin, 5 WIS. ENVTL. L. J. 187 (1998) (providing a thorough, and fairly exceptional,
analysis of one state's dam laws).

164

We focused on Georgia, Maine, Montana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin. We chose Georgia and
Texas because they have large numbers of dams (Texas has more than any other state) and high levels of aquatic
biodiversity. Montana and Oregon both have relatively abundant dams, significant hydropower capacity, and
significant fishery resources. Wisconsin and Pennsylvania both have reputations as leaders in the field of dam
removal. Finally, studies by The Nature Conservancy show that Maine has very high potential as a focal area
for dam removal projects, and, more parochially, we live there.

165

See generally Georgia Safe Dams Act of 1978, GA. CODE. ANN. §§ 12-5-370 to -385 (2014) (exempting from
the definition of dams those that were constructed or financially assisted by federal agencies before November 1,
1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 636 (2013) (requiring environmental review of new hydroelectric dams
in Maine, but not existing ones).

166

E.g., Kelroy, supra note 163, at 197 (discussing Wisconsin law).

167

See, e.g.,id. at 192 (noting the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources' limited authority to regulate alreadybuilt dams). A limited exception to this generalization comes from Maine, where the commissioner of the
Department of Marine Resources may require fish passage for dams on waterways “frequented by... migratory
fish species.” ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 12760 (2013).

168

See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN., § 12-3-375 (2014) (requiring periodic “re-inventories” of dams, but making no
mention of environmental review).

169

See, e.g., Karrigan S. Bork et al., The Rebirth of California Fish & Game Code Section 5937: Water for Fish, 45 UC
DAVIS L. REV. 809, 817-44 (2012) (chronicling years of non-implementation of California's fish passage law).
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170

See generally Klein, supra note 11 (chronicling the rise of environmental law and the decline of dam building).

171

See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-377(a) (2014) (“It shall be unlawful for the owner or operator of any dam
for which a permit is required by this part to remove the dam without the approval of the director.”); Save Our
Sebasticook, Inc. v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 928 A.2d 736, 740-41 (Me. 2007) (citing state law that limits dam owners'
ability to make flow changes).

172

For examples of safety standards, see ASS'N OF STATE DAM SAFETY OFFICIALS, SUMMARY OF
STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON DAM SAFETY (2000).

173

Naomi Schalit & John Christie, Maine's High-Hazard Dams Lack Inspection, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Aug.
24, 2011), http:// bangordailynews.com/2011/08/24/news/state/half-of-high-hazard-dams-lack-state-inspection
(quoting University of Hawaii civil engineering professor Peter Nicholson).

174

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 37-B, § 1113 (2013) (requiring inspections); Schalit & Christie, supra note 173.

175

Mose Buchele, How Hundreds of ‘Significant Hazard’ Dams Escape State Inspection in Texas, STATEIMPACT
TEX. (Oct. 15, 2013), http:// stateimpact.npr.org/texas/2013/10/15/how-hundreds-of-significant-hazard-damsescape-state-inspection/; Mose Buchele, Want to Learn About a Nearby Dam? In Texas, Some Questions Are
Off Limits, STATEIMPACT TEX. (Oct. 16, 2013), http:// stateimpact.npr.org/texas/2013/10/16/want-to-learnabout-a-nearby-dam-in-texas-some-questions-are-off-limits/.

176

See 2013 Report Card for America's Infrastructure: Dams: Conditions and Capacity, AM. SOC'Y OF CIVIL
ENG'RS, http:// www.infrastructurereportcard.org/a/#p/dams/conditions-and-capacity (last visited Oct. 25,
2014).

177

HEINZ CTR., supra note 68, at 31 (classifying the ownership status of 14.8% of the dams in the Army Corps'
database as “undetermined”).

178

See Catherine C. Engberg, Note, The Dam Owner's Guide to Retirement Planning: Assessing Owner Liability
for Downstream Sediment Flow from Obsolete Dams, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 177, 190-91 (2002). But some
elements of tort law may inhibit dam removals. Seeid. at 191-97. Owners also may not understand their
responsibilities. Greg Bruno, Local Aging Dams Need Repair, TIMES HERALD-RECORD (May 14, 2007),
http:// www.recordonline.com/article/20070514/News/705140319 (quoting the deputy executive director of the
American Society of Civil Engineers: “Most private owners really don't have a very good understanding of the
liability that they own....”).

179

See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Patterson, 333 F. Supp. 2d 906, 924-25 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that the
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation violated California Fish and Game Code section 5936 by failing to release water
to the San Joaquin River below Friant Dam); Bork et al., supra note 169, at 860-83 (describing the Patterson
litigation and other California cases).

180

See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 37-B, § 1130 (2013) (creating a fund to support, among other things,
“breaching of or removal of a dam”); Kelroy, supra note 163, at 200-04 (discussing Wisconsin law allowing
removals of abandoned dams, but also limits upon that authority).

181

See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-1-224 (2013) (allowing the destruction of beaver dams if they endanger
public health). One might assume that beaver dam removals also would bring fish passage benefits, but that
assumption would be incorrect. Michael M. Pollock et al., Hydrologic and Geomorphic Effects of Beaver Dams
and Their Influence on Fishes, 37 AM. FISHERIES SOC'Y SYMPOSIUM 213, 223 (2003) (“[T]he pond habitat
formed by beaver dams is highly beneficial to many fishes and... species regularly cross dams in both upstream
and downstream directions.”).
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182

See, e.g., Eva Hershaw, Dams Are Coming Down, But Not in Texas, REPORTING TEX. (Dec. 9, 2011), http://
reportingtexas.com/dams-come-down-around-u-s-but-not-in-texas/ (“State regulators have limited powers to
force down a dam, and even if they tried, the process is extraordinarily bureaucratic.”).

183

A renewable portfolio standard requires a state's energy suppliers to purchase or generate a percentage of their
energy from renewable sources.

184

For a thorough compilation of information on state renewable energy incentives, see DSIRE, http://
www.dsireusa.org (last visited Nov. 3, 2014).

185

See ASHLEY JOHNSON, NAT'L HYDROPOWER ASSOC., STATE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO
STANDARD REPORT: SPRING 2011 UPDATE 4 (2011), available at http:// www.hydro.org/wp-content/
uploads/2011/10/State-RPS-standards-updated-August-2011.pdf.

186

See generally id. (summarizing state programs and regulations, regarding hydropower projects).

187

See KSE Focus, States Debate Large-Scale Hydro Power and Renewable Portfolio Standards, CONGRESS.ORG
(Aug. 7, 2013), http:// congress.org/2013/08/07/states-debate-large-scale-hydro-power-and-renewable-portfoliostandards.

188

See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 185, at 32-33 (describing Minnesota's size-based thresholds); Memorandum
from David Beaujon to the Members of the Water Res. Review Comm. 2 (Oct. 7, 2013) (on file with
Colorado Legislative Council Staff) (describing the purely size-based criteria for including hydroelectric power
in Colorado's RPS).

189

See generally DSIRE,supra note 184 (summarizing state programs).

190

The primary exception to this generalization is a statute known as the Maine Rivers Policy. See Leandro E.
Miranda, A Review of Guidance and Criteria for Managing Reservoirs and Associated Riverine Environments to
Benefit Fish and Fisheries, inDAMS, FISH AND FISHERIES: OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES AND
CONFLICT RESOLUTION,supra note 93, at 91, 120 (describing the Maine Rivers Policy).

191

Questions About Removing Dams, supra note 101.

192

See supra note 63 and accompanying text.

193

See Michael J. Kuby et al., A Multiobjective Optimization Model for Dam Removal: An Example Trading
off Salmon Passage with Hydropower and Water Storage in the Willamette Basin, 28 ADVANCES WATER
RESOURCES 845, 853 (2005) ( “Currently, dam removal is considered mainly on a dam-by-dam basis.”).

194

For maps of the watershed and the project area, see Penobscot River Restoration Project, PENOBSCOT RIVER
RESTORATION TRUST, http:// www.penobscotriver.org/content/4020/maps (last visited Sept. 19, 2014).

195

See ANDREW J. PERSHING ET AL., THE FUTURE OF COD IN THE GULF OF MAINE 1-3 (2013);
Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 81 MINN. L. REV. 869, 946-47 (1997)
(describing the demise of northeastern fisheries); Opperman et al., supra note 5.

196

See Opperman et al., supra note 5.

197

In New England, the preferred way to deliver logs to mills was to float them downriver. See Penobscot
Watersheds, ME. RIVERS, http:// mainerivers.org/watershed-profiles/penobscot-watershed/ (last visited Oct. 6,
2014).
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198

See Laura Rose Day, Restoring Native Fisheries to Maine's Largest Watershed: The Penobscot River Restoration
Project, 134 J. CONTEMP. WATER RES. & EDUC. 29, 29 (2006); Opperman et al., supra note 5.

199

Compared to other northeastern watersheds, this density of dams is quite low. MARTIN & APSE,
NORTHWEST AQUATIC CONNECTIVITY, supra note 47, at 61-62.

200

See Opperman et al., supra note 5.

201

See NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, ATLANTIC SALMON IN MAINE 8 (2004) (“[D] ams... have made an enormous
amount of habitat unavailable to Maine salmon and have affected much of the habitat that is still available.”).

202

Opperman et al., supra note 5.

203

NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 201, at 11.

204

See Opperman et al., supra note 5.

205

Tara R. Trinko Lake et al., Evaluating Changes in Diadromous Species Distributions and Habitat Accessibility
Following the Penobscot River Restoration Project, 4 MARINE & COASTAL FISHERIES: DYNAMICS,
MGMT., & ECOSYSTEM SCI. 284, 285 (2012).

206

Opperman et al., supra note 5; see also Gail Courey Toensing, $25 Million Raised to Begin
Ambitious Penobscot River Restoration Project, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Feb. 11, 2008),
http:// indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2008/02/11/25-million-raised-begin-ambitious-penobscot-riverrestoration-project-92202. Toensing quotes John Banks, director of the Penobscot Nation's Department of
Natural Resources:
You often hear people talk about we are the river, the river is us. It defines us as a tribe, it defines who we are,
where we came from, and many of our cultural traditions are tied to the river and its resources. We've evolved as
a riverine tribe for 10,000 years here. The river has provide[d] all of our needs--physically, culturally, spiritually
and allowed us to prosper for thousands of years.
Id.

207

See Toensing, supra note 206.

208

See
Disaster
Declaration
Issued
for
NE
Groundfish
Industry,
SAVING
SEAFOOD
(Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.savingseafood.org/washington/disaster-declaration-issued-for-ne-groundfishindustry-2.html; Kevin Miller, New England Fishery Disaster Bill Sent to Senate, PORTLAND
PRESS HERALD (July 19, 2013), http://www.pressherald.com/2013/07/19/fishery-disaster-bill-sent-to-senate_
2013-07-19. See generally Edward P. Ames & John Lichter, Gadids and Alewives: Structure Within Complexity
in the Gulf of Maine, 141 FISHERIES RES. 70, 75-78 (2013) (“[I]f diadromous species recover, local gadids may
re-establish their metapopulation structures in northeastern New England.”).

209

See, e.g., NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 201, at 12 (“Since most Maine salmon are now in the Penobscot
River, that population should be a primary focus for rehabilitating the species in Maine.... A program of dam
removal should be started.”).

210

See HALL & REEVES, supra note 61, at 3 (showing dam ownership patterns).

211

See Opperman et al., supra note 5.

212

See id.

213

See Crane, supra note 130, at 135-43. For a comparison of the Edwards Dam removal to that of the
Penobscot River, see John Holyoke, Edwards Dam Success Foreshadows Penobscot River Project's Future,
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BANGOR DAILY NEWS (June 8, 2012), http://bangordailynews.com/2012/06/08/outdoors/edwards-damsuccess-foreshadows-penobscot-river-projects-future/.

214

See Crane, supra note 130, at 142-46; see also The 10th Anniversary of the Removal of Maine's Edwards Dam,
AM. RIVERS, http:// www.americanrivers.org/initiative/dams/projects/the-10th-anniversary-of-the-removalof-mainea%C2%89uas-edwards-dam (last visited on Oct. 9, 2014).

215

See Blumm & Erickson, supra note 38, at 1050-54.

216

See Opperman et al., supra note 5 (describing the process).

217

See id.

218

Submittal of the Lower Penobscot River Basin Comprehensive Settlement Agreement with Explanatory
Statement at 1-4, PPL Me., LLC, 111 FERC 62,062 (2004) (No. DI97-10), available at http://
www.penobscotriver.org/assets/LowerPenobscotAgreement__FERC__June_25_04_ reduced_size.pdf.

219

Opperman et al., supra note 5. (“Under the agreement, PPL granted a five-year option to purchase three dams...
to the newly created not-for-profit Penobscot River Restoration Trust [] for between US$24 million and US
$26 million.”). They completed the purchase in 2008, using $25 million raised from a combination of public
and private sources. Press Release, Penobscot River Restoration Trust, Fisheries Restoration, Energy Balance
Closer to Becoming Reality on Penobscot River (Aug. 21, 2008), available at http:// www.penobscotriver.org/
assets/FINAL_Penobscot_Aug_21_Event_pr.pdf.

220

See Opperman et al., supra note 5.

221

See id.

222

See id.

223

See id.

224

See id.

225

See Trinko Lake et al., supra note 205, at 288.

226

See Opperman et al., supra note 5.

227

See Lynne Y. Lewis et al., Dams, Dam Removal and River Restoration: A Hedonic Property Value Analysis,
26 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 175, 185 (2008) (documenting rising property values after the Edwards
Dam removal); see alsoRecreational and Economic Benefits of Edwards Dam Removal, ME. RIVERS, http://
mainerivers.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Edwards-Dam-Benefits-NRCM.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2014).

228

Fact Sheet, PENOBSCOT RIVER RESTORATION TRUST, http:// www.penobscotriver.org/assets/
Fact_Sheet_Oct17_2013.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2014).

229

See Opperman et al., supra note 5.

230

See id. (showing the power capacity of the removed dams).

231

Id. (“Although generation will be maintained or slightly increased from the Penobscot, greater hydropower
generation would have been possible through operational changes or capacity or efficiency upgrades at all of
the dams.”).

232

Id.
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233

See Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 132 FERC P 62,261 (2010) (discussing FERC's policies on off-site mitigation, though
disapproving it in the matter at hand). Dam removals have rarely been part of that mitigation, but FERC has
approved that approach. See, e.g., Bangor-Pac. Hydro Assocs., 47 FERC P 61,165 (1989) (approving BangorPacific Hydro Associates' application to amend its project license in exchange for alternative off-site mitigation
measures).

234

See, e.g., Erie Boulevard Hydropower, LP, 98 FERC P 61,145 (2002) (discussing a proceeding and settlement
involving four projects on the Raquette River in New York); Joe DosSantos & Tim Swant, Collaboration
or Confrontation? Take Your Pick: Clark Fork Projects Hydro Relicensing, CLARK FORK SYMPOSIUM,
http:// cas.umt.edu/clarkfork/Abstracts/presenters/DosSantospaper.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2013) (describing
a relicensing process involving two major dams).

235

See generally CHARLES V. STERN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42158, KLAMATH BASIN
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS (2014) (describing recent agreements and developments in the Klamath
conflict).

236

SeeBUREAU OF RECLAMATION, supra note 40, at 2 (committing federal agencies to this search).

237

See G.E. JOHNSON ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, THE INTEGRATED BASIN-SCALE
OPPORTUNITY ASSESSMENT INITIATIVE: PHASE 1 METHODOLOGY AND PRELIMINARY
SCOPING ASSESSMENTS FOR THE CONNECTICUT AND ROANOKE RIVER BASINS (2013);
Geerlofs et al., supra note 40.

238

See Email from Jeffrey Opperman, Lead Scientist, Great Rivers P'ship, The Nature Conservancy, to Dave Owen,
Professor of Law, Univ. of Me. Law Sch. (Nov. 13, 2014, 11:54 EST) (on file with author).

239

In making this statement, we are not arguing that every dam removal project should be accompanied by an
offsetting increase in hydropower capacity. Sometimes the lost hydropower capacity will be a very small price
to pay for the associated environmental improvements.

240

See, e.g., Kuby et al., supra note 193, at 851 (concluding selective dam removal “could reconnect most of
the drainage area of the Willamette River to the Pacific Ocean--with little loss of hydropower and/or storage
capacity”).

241

We have found one article that contemplates this possibility. See Workman, supra note 31, at 40.

242

For a somewhat analogous example, see Edwards Mfg. Co., Inc., 84 FERC P 61,227 (1998). That decision
approved a settlement agreement whereby upstream dam owners obtained delays in the imposition of fish
passage requirements by contributing funding to support the Edwards Dam's removal. Id. at P 62,091.

243

For any such program, defining the geographic scale of the trading area will be a challenge, and the choice will
likely depend upon the environmental goals driving the trading system.

244

See supra notes 209-32 and accompanying text.

245

The Edwards Dam settlement also provides an example: Bath Ironworks contributed $2.5 million to the dam
removal and in return obtained the ability to fill fifteen acres of wetlands. See Pete Didisheim, Dam Removal
Foe Misinformed, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, July 12, 1999, at A7 (explaining the deal).

246

See BECCA MADSEN ET AL., ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE, STATE OF BIODIVERSITY
MARKETS: OFFSET AND COMPENSATION PROGRAMS WORLDWIDE 21 (2010) (describing pilot
trading programs in the Willamette River and Chesapeake Bay basins).
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247

The Bonneville Power Administration, which runs hydropower dams throughout the Columbia River
Basin, maintains an environmental mitigation fund designed to serve this general purpose. SeeDam
Removal on Snake River Tributary: Dutch Flat Dam, BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN. (Nov. 8,
2013, 1:25 PM), http://www.bpa.gov/news/newsroom/Pages/Dam-removal-on-Snake-River-tributary-DutchFlat-Dam.aspx (describing a specific dam removal and the larger program).

248

See E-mail from Jeffrey Opperman to Dave Owen, supra note 238 (describing several countries in which The
Nature Conservancy is working on this challenge).

249

For discussion of this early history, see TOM TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN
REFORMING POLLUTION POLICY 9-11 (1985).

250

See Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old
Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 1-3 (1991).

251

See id. at 6 (asserting that “[u]niform emission standards... tend to lead to inefficient outcomes” because “the
costs of controlling pollutant emissions vary greatly among and even within firms”).

252

See Jody Freeman, The Story of Chevron: Environmental Law and Administrative Discretion, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 171, 178-79 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005).

253

Id.

254

See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 250, at 3 (arguing that policymakers had “largely ignored” economists' calls for
incentive-based regulatory systems).

255

See Freeman, supra note 252, at 178-84 (describing the evolution of this “bubble” concept).

256

See id. at 173 (describing the “bubble” concept's metamorphosis into modern cap-and-trade programs).

257

See Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 361, 368 (1989).

258

Richard Schmalensee & Robert N. Stavins, The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand
Policy Experiment, 27 J . ECON. PERSP. 103, 103 (2013) (describing that hostility).

259

See id. at 104 (arguing that the acid rain program succeeded, albeit in unexpected ways); see also Goulder, supra
note 33, at 100.

260

See Richard G. Newell et al., Carbon Markets 15 Years After Kyoto: Lessons Learned, New Challenges, 27 J.
ECON. PERSP. 123, 123-24 (2013) (describing the international proliferation of carbon trading schemes).

261

See generally Salzman & Ruhl, Currencies and Commodification, supra note 24 (describing habitat trading, with
a particular focus on wetlands).

262

See generally LICHATOWICH, supra note 91 (describing decades of failed salmon management).

263

33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2013).

264

See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Gaming the Past: The Theory and Practice of Historic Baselines in the
Administrative State, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1, 29-35 (2011) (describing the evolution and implementation of the
“no-net-loss” policy).

265

See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WETLANDS COMPENSATORY MITIGATION (2008)), available at
http:// water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/upload/2003_05_30_wetlands_ CMitigation.pdf.

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

47

McKenzie, Colin 10/23/2017
For Educational Use Only

TRADING DAMS, 48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1043

266

See NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, COMPENSATING FOR WETLAND LOSSES UNDER THE CLEAN
WATER ACT 64-67 (2001).

267

See generally ENVTL. LAW INST., THE STATUS AND CHARACTER OF IN-LIEU FEE MITIGATION
IN THE UNITED STATESS (2006) (describing how in-lieu fee programs function, as well as common problems
that arise with those programs).

268

See Royal C. Gardner, Banking on Entrepreneurs: Wetlands, Mitigation Banking, and Takings, 81 IOWA L.
REV. 527, 540, 551 (1993) (describing the emergency of wetlands mitigation banking).

269

See MADSEN ET AL., supra note 246, at iv (describing wetlands mitigation in the United States).

270

See Tietenberg, supra note 25, at 63 (describing many applications).

271

See Salzman & Ruhl, Currencies and Commodification, supra note 24, at 648-49 & n.102.

272

Cindy Chu, Thirty Years Later: The Global Growth of ITQs and Their Influence on Stock Status in Marine
Fisheries, 10 FISH & FISHERIES 217, 217 (2009).

273

See, e.g., Thomas Graff & David Yardas, Reforming Western Water Policy: Markets and Regulation, 12 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 165, 166 (1998) (arguing that water markets could play an important part in reforming
water use).

274

See MARGARET WALLS & VIRGINIA MCCONNELL, TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS IN
U.S. COMMUNITIES: EVALUATING PROGRAM DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, AND OUTCOMES
8 (2007).

275

See generally Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, supra note 30, at 1365 n.13 (arguing, for these
reasons and others, that market-based regulation is superior to alternative approaches).

276

See Todd BenDor & Nicholas Brozovic, Determinants of Spatial and Temporal Patterns in Compensatory
Wetland Mitigation, 40 ENVTL. M GMT. 349, 351 (2007) (summarizing critiques of traditional wetland
mitigation).

277

See Fisher-Vanden & Olmstead, supra note 32, at 147.

278

See, e.g., Jessica Fox & Anamaria Nino-Murcia, Status of Species Conservation Banking in the United
States, 19 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 996, 997 (2005) (“Government-initiated Web sites maintaining
conservation bank data are out of date, incomplete, and not useful for gaining a comprehensive understanding
of the practice.”); Rebecca Lave et al., Why You Should Pay Attention to Stream Mitigation Banking,
26 ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION 287, 288 (2008) (arguing that the question “does aquatic ecosystem
restoration actually work?” has received “relatively little documentation”).

279

See, e.g., Schmalensee & Stavins, supra note 258 (arguing that the SO2 trading system performed in unexpected
ways and succeeded for unexpected reasons).

280

The most thorough development of this critique comes from Salzman and Ruhl, Currencies and Commodification,
supra note 24, at 633-34.

281

See, e.g., Eric T. Freyfogle, Water Rights and the Common Wealth, 26 ENVTL. L. 27, 35-37 (1996) (critiquing
water rights trading).

282

SeeMemorandum of Agreement Between the Department of the Army and the Environmental Protection Agency:
The Determination of Mitigation Under the Clean Water Act Section 4(b)(1) Guidelines, U.S. ENVTL.
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PROT. AGENCY, http:// water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/mitigate.cfm (last updated Mar. 6, 2012)
(emphasizing on-site, in-kind mitigation).

283

See ROYAL C. GARDNER, LAWYERS, SWAMPS, AND MONEY: U.S. WETLAND LAW, POLICY,
AND POLITICS 105-09 (2011) (describing these and other reasons for the failures of permittee-responsible
mitigation).

284

See 33 C.F.R. § 332.3 (2014) (establishing preferences for mitigation banking, in-lieu fee programs, and watershed
approaches over on-site, permittee-responsible mitigation).

285

See WILKINSON ET AL., supra note 41, at 30-31 (describing the Corps' movement toward a “watershed”
approach).

286

The development of new pricing systems, like in-lieu fees, and of both private and public expertise are also
important examples.

287

See generallyMADSEN ET AL.,supra note 246, at 19 (noting that developing transparency systems has been
an important innovation); WILKINSON ET AL., supra note 41, at 30-31 (describing the recent and potential
future evolution of habitat trading systems); Owen, Mapping, Modeling, supra note 41, at 267-73 (describing how
technological advances can improve trading systems).

288

See Goulder, supra note 33, at 91.

289

See id. at 94 (emphasizing the importance of context-appropriate design).

290

EME Homer City Generation, LP v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 11-12 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev'd, and remanded, 134 S. Ct.
1584 (2014); North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 922 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam), reh'g granted in part, 550
F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (remanding rule to EPA).

291

16 U.S.C. § 803(a)(1) (2013).

292

See supra note 234 and accompanying text.

293

FERC uses reopener clauses primarily to allow reinitiation of proceedings when additional fish protection
measures become necessary. See Wis. Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 32 F.3d 1165 (7th
Cir. 1994) (upholding this practice against a challenge from licensees).

294

See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 132 FERC P 61,224, 62,261 (2010) (noting FERC's willingness to use offsite mitigation).

295

A series of cases involving the Buford Dam, which lies at the center of one of the Southeast's largest water
disputes, exemplifies the potential complexity of the legal regime for federally owned dams. See In re Tri-State
Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160, 1167-78 (11th Cir. 2011) (summarizing the controversy and prior rounds
of prior litigation).

296

See 33 U.S.C. § 2283 (2013) (“After consultation with appropriate Federal and non-Federal agencies, the
Secretary is authorized to mitigate damages to fish and wildlife resulting from any water resources project under
his jurisdiction....”).

297

See HALL & REEVES, supra note 61, at 1 (discussing the size of different classes of dams).

298

See generally Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private Property Solution, 78 U.
COLO. L. REV. 533, 570-76 (2007) (explaining how regulatory caps allow environmental trading systems to
function).

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

49

McKenzie, Colin 10/23/2017
For Educational Use Only

TRADING DAMS, 48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1043

299

See generally Uma Outka, Environmental Law and Fossil Fuels: Barriers to Renewable Energy, 65 VAND. L.
REV. 1679 (2012) (cataloguing ways in which existing law favors fossil fuel energy).

300

See id. at 1696, 1702-19 (cataloguing legal advantages enjoyed by fossil fuels).

301

See LORI BIRD ET AL., NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., IMPLICATIONS OF CARBON
REGULATION FOR GREEN POWER MARKETS 2 (2007).

302

See generally Lincoln Davies, Incentivizing Renewable Energy Deployment: Renewable Portfolio Standards and
Feed-In Tariffs, 1 KOREA LEGIS. RES. INST. J.L. & LEGIS. 40 (2011) (explaining how renewable portfolio
standards and feed-in tariffs function).

303

See generally U .S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supranote 51 (showing hundreds of non-powered dams across the
nation).

304

See generally Hahn & Stavins, supra note 250, at 6 (noting the importance of disparities in compliance costs).

305

See, e.g., ERIK H. MARTIN & COLIN D. APSE, CHESAPEAKE FISH PASSAGE PRIORITIZATION:
AN ASSESSMENT OF DAMS IN THE CHESAPEAKE BAY WATERSHED 26 (2013) (prioritizing dams
on the basis of “ecological benefit”); MARTIN & APSE, NORTHEAST AQUATIC CONNECTIVITY,supra
note 47, at 29-30 (prioritizing dams on the basis of environmental impact).

306

See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.

307

The Edwards Dam story illustrates this dynamic. While the dam made little economic sense, its owners were
only willing to consider removal when confronted with a combination of legal threats and financial carrots. See
Crane, supra note 130, at 135-43; see also Blumm & Erickson, supra note 38, at 1073-76 (describing how legal
leverage and federal funding facilitated the removal of the Savage Rapids Dam in Oregon).

308

See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.

309

Financial payments could substitute for regulatory leverage--if sufficient money is available. See generally
Barton H. Thompson, Markets for Nature, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 261, 268-94 (2000)
(describing acquisition programs and their funding challenges).

310

See supra notes 113-42 and accompanying text.

311

See 16 U.S.C. § 808(a)(1) (2013).

312

See Amos, supra note 136, at 9-13.

313

See 16 U.S.C. § 799 (2013) (authorizing up to fifty-year license terms).

314

See Cal. Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 472 F.3d 593, 594-95 (9th Cir. 2006)
(finding that ongoing dam operations under a federal license did not require ESA consultation).

315

See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.

316

We are not aware of any court that has so held, and there are potential legal arguments to the contrary. But
cases from other contexts illustrate how authorizing legislation can constrain dam operations. See, e.g.,In re TriState Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160, 1186-92 (11th Cir. 2011) (providing a detailed analysis of authorizing
legislation for the Buford Dam).

317

See supra note 156 and accompanying text (describing controversies surrounding California's Yuba River).
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318

See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.

319

See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.

320

See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying text.

321

See generally Engberg, supra note 178, at 188-91 (discussing tort liabilities associated with dams).

322

See generally Blumm & Erickson, supra note 38 (describing multiple dam removals that involved infusions of
government money).

323

See supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.

324

See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, supranote 51 (finding potential for new development).

325

See J.B. Ruhl, Harmonizing Commercial Wind Power and the Endangered Species Act Through Administrative
Reform, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1769, 1788 (2012) (noting that the ESA does not give wind power a “green pass”).

326

In the course of our research, we have not identified any such programs.

327

See supra notes 113-48 and accompanying text (describing the FERC process).

328

See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, Market Incentives, supra note 30, at 180 (arguing that a tradable permits system
“would immediately eliminate most of the information processing tasks that are presently overwhelming the
federal and state bureaucracies”).

329

For a general discussion of the role of information in environmental trading systems, see Owen, Mapping,
Modeling, supra note 41, at 267-73.

330

See Susan Walker et al., Why Bartering Biodiversity Fails, 2 CONSERVATION LETTERS 149, 154 (2009).

331

Salzman & Ruhl, Currencies and Commodification, supra note 24, at 622-30 (describing the prevalence of nonfungibility).

332

See Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles' Failed
Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 231, 252 (1999).

333

See Salzman & Ruhl, No Net Loss, supra note 32, at 330-36.

334

See Salzman & Ruhl, Currencies and Commodification, supra note 24, at 612 (arguing that wetlands trading
historically involved too much tolerance for non-fungible trades).

335

CO2e stands for CO2 equivalent, which is the metric of choice for greenhouse gas trading.

336

See B. Kelsey Jack et al., Designing Payments for Ecosystem Services: Lessons from Previous Experience with
Incentive-Based Mechanisms, 105 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 9465, 9467 (2008) (noting the role of proxy
measures in environmental trading systems).

337

See Tietenberg, supra note 25, at 87 (noting that traders will generally seek the lowest-cost transaction without
regard to environmental benefits).

338

See Owen, Mapping, Modeling, supra note 41, at 267-68.

339

See id.
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340

See, e.g., Acid Rain Program SO2 Allowances Fact Sheet, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Sept. 11, 2014),
http:// www.epa.gov/airmarkt/trading/factsheet.html (describing the program).

341

See Morgan Robertson, The Work of Wetland Credit Markets: Two Cases in Entrepreneurial Wetland Banking, 17
WETLANDS ECOLOGY & MGMT. 35, 47 (2009) (explaining how wetlands banking requires human contact
and site-specific expertise).

342

See, e.g., id. (highlighting the role of discretionary judgment in wetlands mitigation banking.

343

For a general description of those laws, and they ways they can constrain changes in water use, see BARTON
H. THOMPSON ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 167-443 (5th ed. 2013).

344

See New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931) (“A river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure.”). As
one would-be dam trader explained to us, “[t]he main challenge I found was that each dam has such unique and
intricate characteristics and even when there's no clear title, or it's been abandoned, the surrounding community
feels a ‘claim’ on it, as a historical or cultural heritage....” Email from James G. Workman to Dave Owen,
Professor of Law, Univ. of Me. Law Sch. (Dec. 5, 2011, 12:02 AM EST) (on file with author).

345

We have found only one example of such guidance. See infra notes 354-56 and accompanying text.

346

For general discussion of advances in computer-based river system modeling, see CONVERGING WATERS:
INTEGRATING COLLABORATIVE MODELING WITH PARTICIPATORY PROCESSES TO MAKE
WATER RESOURCE DECISIONS (Lisa Bourget ed., 2011) [hereinafter CONVERGING WATERS].

347

See, e.g., MARTIN & APSE, NORTHEAST AQUATIC CONNECTIVITY, supra note 47 (creating such
priority systems for rivers in the northeastern United States).

348

See generally Kemp & O'Hanley, supra note 94 (summarizing this literature).

349

See, e.g., JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 237 (reporting on the Basin-Scale Opportunity Assessment initiative);
Geerlofs et al., supra note 40 (discussing the Deschutes River Basis, a pilot basin to test the Basic Scale
Opportunities Assessment).

350

See generally CONVERGING WATERS, supra note 346 (providing multiple examples of watershed-scale
modeling). For cautionary studies discussing the limits of environmental modeling, see James D. Fine & Dave
Owen, Technocracy and Democracy: Conflicts Between Modeling and Participation in Environmental Law and
Planning, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 921-38 (2005); and Wendy Wagner et al., Misunderstanding Models in
Environmental and Public Health Regulation, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 293, 316-45 (2010).

351

See, e.g., Bill Provencher et al., Does Small Dam Removal Affect Local Property Values? An Empirical Analysis,
26 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 187, 187 (2008) (finding that dam removal is value-neutral for riparian parcels
and increases value for other nearby parcels); see also Sara E. Johnson & Brian E. Graber, Enlisting the Social
Sciences in Decisions About Dam Removal, 52 BIOSCIENCE 731, 733-36 (2008) (describing techniques for
enlisting community support).

352

See, e.g., MARTIN & APSE, NORTHEAST AQUATIC CONNECTIVITY, supra note 47 (creating a
prioritization system to support such decisions).

353

See Owen, Mapping, Modeling, supra note 41, at 268-73 (explaining how up-front planning can help regulators
design environmental trading systems).

354

See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS ET AL., DETERMINING APPROPRIATE COMPENSATORY
MITIGATION CREDIT FOR DAM REMOVAL PROJECTS IN NORTH CAROLINA 1-20 (2008).
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355

See Public Notice, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, WILMINGTON DIST. (May 7, 2012) (withdrawing
the guidance).

356

Some scientists might also criticize their currency as crude, for it focuses primarily on linear miles of restored
streams. See Lave et al., supra note 278, at 288 (claiming reliance on linear stream length as the sole currency
“is deeply problematic”). But the guidance does identify additional adjustment factors, and dam removers can
obtain additional credit by monitoring the recovery of the undammed stream system. See U.S. ARMY CORPS
OF ENG'RS ET AL., supra note 354, at 6-13.

357

See, e.g., Dave Owen, Critical Habitat and the Challenge of Regulating Small Harms, 64 FLA. L. REV. 141,
193-94 (2012) [hereinafter Critical Habitat] (suggesting that dam removals might be used to mitigate impacts to
endangered species' critical habitat).

358

See, e.g., Tammy Hill et al., Compensatory Stream and Wetland Mitigation in North Carolina: An Evaluation of
Regulatory Success, 51 ENVTL. MGMT. 1077 (2013) (documenting improving performance).

359

See supra notes 165-90 and accompanying text.

360

While a full description of these recommendations is beyond the scope of this paper, we think several federal
reforms offer promise: (1) FWS and NMFS could issue guidance on using dam removals as mitigation for
impacts to endangered species; (2) FWS could use endangered species recovery planning as a platform for
developing basin-scale restoration plans. Those plans could identify opportunities--and mitigation values--for
dam removals, and could also identify overall caps on dam-related species impacts; (3) The U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers could develop guidance documents on using dam removal to mitigate the impacts of filling wetlands
and waterways; (4) FERC could reserve authority to reopen licenses whenever a basin-scale planning effort is
underway; (5) FERC could adjust the duration of licenses so that multiple facilities on the same river come up
for relicensing at the same time; (6) FERC could impose system benefits charges on all hydropower operators to
create a funding base for basin-scale planning; (7) Integrating and expanding upon the preceding ideas, FERC,
other federal agencies, and state agencies could create procedures for “general dam adjudications,” which would
concurrently address the environmental impacts of dams throughout a river system; (8) FERC could create a
revolving planning fund, which would be replenished by charging a portion of the profits of dams allowed to
remain in place. We are indebted to Richard Roos-Collins for that last suggestion.

361

For a summary of problems with long-term grandfathering, see Bruce R. Huber, Transition Policy in
Environmental Law, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 91, 93-94 (2011).

362

See supra notes 313-14 and accompanying text (explaining problems caused by long license periods and staggered
review obligations).

363

See supra notes 318-22 and accompanying text (critiquing state programs).

364

See Why Dams Fail, FEMA (July 24, 2014), http://www.fema.gov/why-dams-fail (describing several prominent
failures).

365

See Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257,
260 (1990) (“Water rights are property.” (emphasis added)).

366

See United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510 (1945) (“Rights, property or otherwise, which are
absolute against all the world are certainly rare, and water rights are not among them.”). See generally Michael
C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Public Trust in Wildlife, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1437, 1451-65 (discussing
how sovereign ownership of wildlife empowers governmental regulation); Brian E. Gray, The Property Right in
Water, 9 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 4 (2002) (discussing the inherent malleability of water
rights); Sax, supra note 365 (discussing regulation of water rights).
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367

See generally Hart, Fish, Dams, and James Madison, supra note 89 (describing this prevalence).

368

See id. at 289-90; see also John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1253 (1996) (arguing that land use regulation has been pervasive since the colonial
era).

369

See generally Dave Owen, Taking Groundwater, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 253 (2014) (providing doctrinal and
theoretical arguments for extensive regulatory authority over water use).

370

See, e.g., Maine Stream Habitat Viewer, ME. STREAM CONNECTIVITY WORKGROUP & ME. OFFICE
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